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Societies that undergo civil armed conflict and remain one state must come to terms with 
a history that has impacted the nation as a whole.  Unlike wars fought on foreign soil, civil wars 
are deeply traumatic to the national group identity and inherently fracture the nation.  In cases 
that have a decisive victor (such as Franco after the Spanish civil war, or Pinochet after Chile’s 
internal strife) the winners have the privilege of constructing, communicating, and enforcing a 
narrative of the conflict.  This historical narrative often does not acknowledge the experiences of 
the vanquished, and enforces an artificial consensus that does not allow for true reconciliation or 
national healing.  
But what happens in a case where the peace is brokered, and all sides are recognized as 
re-constructors of civil society? El Salvador’s peace accord, brokered by the United Nations, 
stipulated that all forces would disarm and that the FMLN guerrilla organization would become a 
political party.  No one was declared a victor, and all sides were equal partners in the 
development of a democratic post-war society.  Because of this inclusive approach to 
establishing peace, many sectors of society were involved in the process.  Though everyone was 
left somewhat unsatisfied with the provisions of the accord, the long and arduous peace process 
did lead to an opening of society with the warring factions left somewhat intact.  Today the 
Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) and Alianza Republicana 
Nacionalista de El Salvador(ARENA) political parties continue to fight for their goals through 
political means.   
Unlike the Spanish or Chilean cases where a narrative of history was imposed, no one 
Salvadoran group was entitled to the privilege of writing history.  For this reason, multiple 
narratives of the conflict still exist and are perpetuated by  political parties, institutions, and 
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private groups who vie for eventual recognition in official history.  Nearly 20 years after the end 
of the conflict, the tension over history is salient and can be seen in the various articulations and 
attempts to preserve competing narratives of the war, particularly  through monuments and 
museums, discussed here as “sites of memory.”   
I argue that the manner in which the conflict ended allowed for a unique historical 
process to begin that allows for particular moments and historical figures to be remembered and 
mythologized, either in a polarizing or a unifying way. Some events and historical people are 
understood in multiple, competing ways that show no sign of a possible reconciliation, while 
others are gradually emerging as the possible beginnings of a unified national narrative about the 
civil conflict.  This process can be seen particularly in the claiming of public spaces, through 
monuments, memorials, street names, and commemorative events that either foster partisanship 
or attempt to bring Salvadoran society together.  
In my thesis, I will first discuss two figures that are irreconcilably polarizing (Chapter 2), 
followed by a discussion of two figures who show the potential to unify the nation (Chapter 3).  
Each section will examine how these figures exemplify either the enduring fracturization or 
emerging unification of  Salvadoran society.  I examine the narratives surrounding these war-
time figures to understand the degree to which their mythologies are consistent or divergent.   Do 
people from across the political spectrum describe them in the same way?  If not, what sorts of 
parallel narratives exists, and can these be attributed to political differences?  And finally, is 
there hope that someday a unified and unifying historical narrative will emerge to help future 
generations make sense of their violent history?  Each of the four examples discussed here has 
undergone a process of mythification by various sectors of society in the nineteen years since the 
end of the war, with different results at the present time.  What they have in common is that they 
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reside in the collective Salvadoran memory, and are invoked for the purposes of present-day 
politicians, religious leaders, and military officials (as well as everyday folks) to make sense of 
the internal violence that ended fewer than two decades ago. 
In Chapter 2, I will address polarizing  narratives of history as exemplified by the 
competing mythologies surrounding Colonel Domingo Monterrosa (1940-1984) and Major 
Roberto D’Aubuisson (1944-1992).  Though there are undoubtedly other moments and people 
about whom competing narratives are constructed and proliferated in El Salvador, these two 
emerged in my research as salient examples of people who are too important to be forgotten, but 
too polarizing to be reconciled. 
Chapter 3 discusses two examples of potentially unifying people: the unifying mythology 
of Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero (1917-1980) and the tumultuous but increasingly accepted 
mythology surrounding the recently deceased FMLN commander and politician, Schafik Jorge 
Handal (1930-2006).  Though of course there are critics of these examples, I argue that there are 
few other figures that are emerging as possible bridges of reconciliation and understanding. 
Overall, Salvadoran society is still deeply fractured, but these examples offer a glimpse of what 








During the 1980s, the armed conflict in El Salvador turned the international spotlight on 
one of the world’s smallest nations, a country long characterized by violent uprisings and 
military repression.  The Salvadoran Civil War, which, by most accounts, lasted from 1980 until 
1992, was the culmination of more than a century of acute social and economic inequality. In El 
Salvador, the structures of power put in place during its time as a Spanish colony hardly changed 
for centuries.   Land and wealth were concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy families, 
commonly referred to as the oligarquía (oligarchy), who privatized collective indigenous land in 
order to construct a semi-feudal coffee empire beginning in the late 1880s.  Though the specific 
practices utilized to ensure social and economic hegemony of landholders (mostly of European 
descent), inequality rooted in the colonial social structure “was perpetrated well into the 
twentieth century by the landed oligarchy, with the assistance of the military.”1 A series of 
military dictatorships with close ties to these ruling families maintained order and met opposition 
with severe repression and violence for over a century. 
Between independence and the 1880s, indigenous people had, on the whole, maintained 
control over communal land.  In the 1860s and -70s, the government had even formalized 
community land management, calling these lands “ejidos,” and documenting their locations. It 
was only at the end of this century that the government developed stricter property laws in order 
to shift towards a system that privileged private property, specifically for coffee growers.  In 
                                                 
1 Richard A. Haggerty, “Historical Setting,” in El Salvador: A Country Study,  ed. Federal Research Division of the 
Library of Congress (Washington, DC: United States Government, 1990), 11.  
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1881, communal lands were “exterminated” through a legislative decree.2   Some of the 
indigenous people were given small parcels of land by the government in exchange for their 
labor on the ever-expanding coffee plantations, while others were forced north to less arable 
land, or to cities to look for work in industrial sectors.  This led to the phenomenon of internal 
seasonal migration, fueled by those campesinos who could just barely subsist on their parcels of 
land, and had to work on plantations during planting and harvesting seasons in order to make 
ends meet.  This allowed coffee to dominate the market further, and by the turn of the twentieth 
century, it made up 76% of El Salvador’s exports.3 The coffee industry propelled an oligarchy 
composed of a handful of families into positions as players in the global economic system.  This 
group of landowners is popularly referred to in El Salvador as the “fourteen families,” (as I saw 
repeatedly in my interviews), though the actual number of powerful families was closer to 
thirty.4  This ruling class developed at the expense of the millions who worked the land.  Rural 
peasants, or campesinos, worked for a modern equivalent of 50 cents a day under harsh 
conditions and without the possibility of upward mobility.5   
This pattern of land distribution, termed a “system of exclusion” by L.M. Ladutke,6 
prevailed for the next hundred years.  The displaced and undermined indigenous and mestizo 
(mixed-race) communities continued to be exploited, while the military and the government 
preserved and protected the coffee-growers’ economic interests. Between the 1880s and 1970s, 
an unprecedented alliance developed between the landholding oligarchy, the political elite, and 
                                                 
2 Spanish, Ministerio de Educación, Historia de El Salvador: Tomo II (San Salvador: Comisión Nacional de los 
Libros de Texto Gratuitos, 1994), 11. 
3 Spanish, Michael Krämer, El Salvador: Unicornio de la Memoria (San Salvador: Museo de la Palabra y la Imagen, 
1998), 19-21. 
4 Spanish, Film.  1932: Cicatriz de la memoria.  
5 Spanish, Film.  1932: Cicatriz de la memoria. 
6 L.M. Ladutke, Freedom of Expression in El Salvador: The Struggle for Human Rights and Democracy (London: 
McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2004). 
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the military. These three institutions crystallized their grip on power through intermarriage and 
routinely exhibited forceful action as the means of upholding the status quo.7  
The only meaningful challenge to the dominant power structure came in January of 1932 
when the worldwide economic depression of the early 1930s drove down coffee prices by 54% 
and “privation among the rural labor force, long a tolerated fact of life, sank to previously 
unknown depths.”8  As the standard of living plummeted among the working class in the early 
1930s, the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES) began to garner support, thanks to a network 
of university students and leaders of various agricultural communities. With coffee prices at an 
all-time low and land reform further out of reach than ever before, leaders of the Communist 
Party covertly organized a uprising of coffee workers.  Across the main coffee-growing regions, 
hundreds of coffee workers under the leadership of Farabundo Martí, Feliciano Ama and others 
raided barracks and took up arms to in the name of revolution.9  In response to this armed revolt, 
the government of  General Martínez Hernández sent out the National Guard, and with the help 
of local militias put down the rebellion.  Within three days the armed forces had achieved their 
goal, but at the human cost of between 10,000 and 30,000 lives, nearly all of these indigenous 
males.10 Richard A. Haggerty describes the legacy of silence that resulted from the massacre:  
No matter what figure one accepts, the reprisals were highly disproportionate to 
the effects  of the communist-inspired insurgency, which produced no more than 
thirty civilian fatalities.  The widespread executions of campesinos, mainly 
Indians, apparently were intended to demonstrate to the rural population that the 
military was now in control… and the memory of la matanza would linger over 
Salvadoran political life for decades, deterring dissent and maintaining a sort of 
coerced conformity.11  
 
                                                 
7 Jeffrey M. Paige, “Coffee and Power in El Salvador.” Latin American Research Review 28:3 (1993): 9. 
8 Country Study, 14. 
9 Spanish. Equipo de Educación MAIZ, Historia de El Salvador: de Como los Guanacos no Sucumbieron a los 
Infames Ultrajes de Españoles, Criollos, Gringos y otras Plagas (San Salvador: Algier’s Impresores, 1995), 82-83. 
10 Ministerio de Educación, 134. 
11 Haggerty, 16. 
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Though this event happened decades before the Salvadoran civil war broke out, it is an important 
precursor to the armed  conflict because it was the nation’s most dramatic example of the lengths 
to which the ruling classes would go to preserve their absolute dominance.  The silencing of 
these voices served as a strong warning that resistance would be met by mass coercion and 
repression.  This fostered a culture of fear and silence that resulted in three decades of stable 
military dictatorship.   
 During the 1970s, the agitation for land reform and for fair elections mobilized increasing 
numbers of the population to take part in protests, boycotts, and other (usually) non-violent 
means of resistance.12 Because of widespread poverty and growing discontent, the ruling class 
organized elections in 1972, but these were fraudulent, and did little to appease popular 
disillusionment.  As White describes: “El Salvador’s dance with democracy ended in 1972 with 
the stolen elections that maintained power in the hands of the elites while further marginalizing 
the poor majority as well as most reformers.”13 
The 1960s and 1970s were also a crucial time in the history of the Catholic Church, both 
internationally and within El Salvador. It was a time of sweeping changes that recognized the 
importance of marginalized communities, such as the Vatican II conference, and the promotion 
of Liberation Theology.  Liberation Theology interpreted the gospel through the lens of 
preferential treatment for the poor. In the Catholic Church across Latin America, clergy and lay 
people alike “began to take their social mission seriously: lay persons committed themselves to 
work among the poor, charismatic bishops and priests encouraged the calls for progress and 
                                                 
12 Rex A. Hudson, “National Security” in El Salvador: A Country Study,  ed. Federal Research Division of the 
Library of Congress (Washington, DC: United States Government, 1990), 239. 
13 Christopher M. White, The History of El Salvador (London: Greenwood Press, 2009), 80. 
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national modernization.”14 In El Salvador, the progressive or liberationist wing of the Catholic 
Church began establishing Comunidades Eclesiásticas de Base (Christian Base Communities or 
CEBs).  This network of grassroots organizations aimed to awaken and nurture class 
consciousness and activism among El Salvador’s marginalized people by preaching Biblical 
preference for the poor.15   
Efforts to educate and organize the masses incurred the wrath of the ruling class in the 
form of unofficial repression from the right-wing militias, otherwise known as the “death 
squads.” These groups were apparently supported financially by the oligarchy and drew on 
active-duty and former military personnel for their members.  The squads assassinated targeted 
clergy members, activists, and other “subversives” in an effort to discourage further anti-
government activities and to deter potential expansion of the ranks of the mass organizations and 
other protest groups.16 
The ongoing repression also sparked the formation of armed revolutionary guerrilla 
groups that split off from the Communist Party (PCES).  The PCES had existed clandestinely 
since the 1932 massacre, and stood for worker’s rights and the eradication of poverty. However, 
in the 1970s the PCES was advocating for a peaceful, democratic route to reform via democratic 
politics, not armed insurgency, and various groups began to break off from each other in pursuit 
of revolution.  The largest of these were the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) and the 
Fuerzas Populares de Liberación (FPL).  Over time, other smaller organizations also splintered 
off from the FPL and the ERP: the Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional (RN), and the 
                                                 
14 Leonardo and Clodovis Boff, A Concise History of Liberation Theology http://www.landreform.org/boff2.htm 
(October 23, 2010).   
15 Haggerty, 31. 
16 Haggerty, 32. 
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Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores Centroamericanos (PRTC).17 The guerrilla groups 
began terrorist-style activities such as planting bombs in government buildings, and galvanized 
young people to join la lucha.   
Inspired by the 1979 Sandinista victory in neighboring Nicaragua, Cuban leader Fidel 
Castro urged reconciliation between the four armed groups and the Communist Party, and 
organized talks in Havana.  In 1980, the four main revolutionary factions (ERP, FPL, FARN, and 
PRTC), as well as the PCES, joined forces to form the Frente Farabundo Martí para la 
Liberación Nacional (FMLN).18  They named their organization after Farabundo Martí, the most 
prominent leader of the 1932 coffee worker revolt.  In doing so, the leaders of the FMLN 
invoked the historical memory of a traumatic event and recast it as the first battle in their armed 
revolution.  Though these organizations promoted different leftist frameworks and ideas about 
what guerrilla tactics would work best, they united in the face of common enemies: the 
weakened state, the coffee oligarchy, and the emboldened military, which more often than not 
protected the interests of the oligarchy rather than the state. 
  The cycle of violence and repression escalated and reached a dramatic apex in March 
1980 with the assassination of the archbishop of San Salvador, Oscar Arnulfo Romero.  Romero, 
who had been selected as archbishop in part because of his moderate political views, was 
influenced strongly by the liberation theology movement, and he was appalled by the brutality 
employed with increasing frequency by government forces against the populace and particularly 
against clergy.  In his weekly radio homilies, he related statistics on political assassination and 
excesses committed by the military.  He frequently urged soldiers to refuse to carry out what he 
characterized as immoral orders.  His high profile made him an important political figure, and he 
                                                 
17 Hudson, 237-239.   
18 Hudson, 237.   
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used his influence to argue against United States military aid to El Salvador.  Despite his stature 
as the country's primary Catholic leader, he was targeted for assassination; all factors indicate 
that the killing was carried out by members of the right-wing death squads, and was most likely 
ordered by prominent politician and military officer Major Roberto d’Aubuisson.19  However, 
the case was never fully investigated or conclusively solved. 
The conflict escalated into a full-fledged civil war once the FMLN became a unified 
entity, and launched an offensive in the capital in January 1981. Though the FMLN offensive 
failed on several fronts, they retained certain military strongholds and focused increasing 
international attention on El Salvador. That same year they managed to assemble the resources to 
launch a guerrilla radio station, Radio Venceremos, from the mountains of the department of 
Morazán, and broadcast nationally to galvanize support. They used a variety of guerrilla 
strategies from destroying infrastructure, to kidnapping foreign businessmen and local 
politicians, and fighting in the most geographically difficult regions of El Salvador.20   
On the other side, the United States gradually invested more and more into counter-
insurgency efforts and, by the height of the war, was providing more than a million dollars a day 
in military and economic aid to El Salvador’s government, as well as military training and 
technology.  The U.S. leadership saw the conflicts in Central America as the front line of the 
Cold War, and spared no available expense.  Since both Cuba and Nicaragua openly backed the 
FMLN, the Reagan Administration considered the Salvadoran guerrilla movement to be part of 
the expanding threat of Communism in Latin America.21  U.S. aid effectively prolonged the war 
and embarrassed both the American and Salvadoran militaries, since the armed forces far 
                                                 
19 John Pike, El Salvador: Civil War http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/elsalvador2.htm (November 
20, 2010). 
20 Hudson, 239.   
21 Haggerty, 42. 
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exceeded the guerrillas in both training and technology, but were not able to win a military 
victory. 
Also, by 1981, Salvadoran conservatives had became so dissatisfied with the existing 
parties that they created a new one, under the leadership of  Major Roberto d’Aubuisson.  They 
called it the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista de El Salvador, (Nationalist Republican Alliance 
of El Salvador, or ARENA).22  Though presidential, municipal, and congressional elections took 
place at different times during the war, they were affected by fraud and voter boycotts, and thus 
are not often credited as being fair or representative.  However, ARENA as a party survived the 
war, and had its presidential candidates elected in four consecutive elections (1989, 1994, 1999, 
and 2004) that were internationally recognized as fair and free. 
During the conflict more than 70,000 people were killed or disappeared, and the public 
demand for a resolution to the conflict escalated in 1989 with the launch of the final FMLN 
offensive in November, in which the guerrillas won over new strongholds in the capital city of 
San Salvador.  During the offensive, six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper and her daughter were 
murdered in the middle of the night at the Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas.  At 
first, the government and military blamed their deaths on the FMLN.  However, international 
investigations revealed that indeed the priests, five of them of Spanish origin, were assassinated 
by the elite Atlacatl military battalion during the offensive.23  Their murders not only increased 
pressure within El Salvador for a resolution to the conflict, but also mounted additional 
international pressure to cease the violence and end human rights abuses, particularly those 
inflicted on foreign nationals.   
                                                 
22 Historia del Mayor Roberto d’Aubuisson, http://www.arena.org.sv/historia.php (December 1, 2010).   
23 For more information about the final offensive and the massacre of the priests, please refer to the book, Paying the 
price: Ignacio Ellacuría and the murdered Jesuits of El Salvador by Teresa Whitfield (Philidelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1995).   
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For the next three years, the United Nations brokered negotiations between the FMLN 
leadership, the government and the military, and on January 16, 1992 the Chapultepec accords 
were signed.  Its main stipulations included a 70% reduction and repurposing of the armed 
forces, the formation of completely new civilian police force, legal amnesty for war related 
crimes, and the disarmament of the FMLN in order for it to become a political party rather than 
an armed group.24  The Salvadoran peace accords are considered to be among the most 
comprehensive and effective in the world, as they have largely been implemented and there has 
been a drastic reduction in human rights abuses .  
As one scholar of Salvadoran history writes, “while the nation had passed through 
repeated cycles of liberalization and repression, Salvadorans had never had a truly democratic 
form of government prior to the 1992 peace accords.”25  Today, that same party which originally 
grew out of the armed revolutionary struggle won the presidency in the historic elections of 
2009.  The election of Mauricio Funes, a former journalist, marked the first peaceful democratic 
transition between the two dominant political parties that came out of the war, ARENA who had 
held the presidential office since 1989, and the FMLN.  
Also, after the war ended, the leftist groups that made up the FMLN once again began 
breaking apart. For the leaders who signed the peace agreements, ARENA’s presidential victory 
in 1994 came as a shocking blow, as did the party’s re-election in 1999 and 2004.  Over the last 
twenty years, the political left has struggled to maintain unity, and the FMLN has increasingly 
distanced itself from its guerrilla past, in order to become more appealing to voters. Because of 
this softening of hard-line ideology, many of the FMLN’s former leaders have left the party.  
Some have departed from El Salvador all together (such as the ERP’s front man Joaquín 
                                                 
24 Margarita S. Studemeister, ed, “El Salvador: Implementation of the Peace Accords,” Peaceworks No. 38.  
(Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2001).  
25 Ladutke, 7. 
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Villalobos).  Others, such as Ana Guadalupe Martínez (one of my interviewees), have found a 
home in smaller political parties such as the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democratic 
Party or PDC).  Still others have removed themselves entirely from politics, such as Carlos 
Henríquez Consalvi, formerly the voice of Radio Venceremos who today runs a small, private 
history museum in San Salvador.  Most of my interviewees agree that the FMLN political party 
of today is more concerned with politics than with pursuing the goals that inspired the revolution. 
On the other hand, ARENA managed to consolidate the right behind a conservative, neo-
liberal agenda.  During ARENA’s twenty years in power, El Salvador signed the Central 
American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and generally promoted the interests of 
entrepreneurs and corporations.  Today, El Salvador is home to Central America’s largest malls 
and it’s best highways, the two legacies that the conservative party points to during election 
seasons.  However, there has been little growth in the provision of basic services such as health, 
education or employment, and the gap between rich and poor has grown dramatically.26 
 
                                                 
26 Spanish, Douglas Olmedo, Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano El Salvador (United Nations Development 
Program, 2010), http://clic.org.sv/?p=12569 (November 7, 2010).   
 16 
Theory 
In my scholarly investigation about historical memory, three main theoretical ideas stood 
out and ultimately impacted the direction of my research.   The first is the basic theory that 
history is not static, but rather interpretations of past events are constantly in flux based on the 
intersection and negotiation of collective memories held and promoted by the various groups that 
make up a society.  Secondly, my project is influenced by the idea that collective memories are 
communicated in narrative accounts that are actively and intentionally transmitted by the group 
that is invested in that narrative’s preservation.  Lastly, I thought extensively about the idea that 
nations that have undergone collective trauma must reach a consensus about the meaning and 
interpretations of past events, and that this consensus is either artificially imposed or genuinely 
agreed upon over the course of time.  
The critical study of history and memory in the discipline of sociology is a relatively 
recent development.  Maurice Halbwachs is widely accepted as the first sociologist to examine 
and address history and memory in his groundbreaking 1950 work On Collective Memory.27  In 
it, he posits the pivotal idea that history is shaped by the collective memories of groups and 
institutions who each interpret and transmit their versions of events to the next generation. He 
states that, “there are as many collective memories as there are groups and institutions in a 
society… individuals, being located in a specific group context, draw on that context to 
remember or recreate the past.”28  This same idea is reiterated by Peter Burke, who states that 
“given the multiplicity of social identities and the co-existence of rival memories and alternative 
memories, it is surely more fruitful to think in pluralistic terms about the uses of memories to 
different social groups, who may well have different views about what is significant or worthy of 
                                                 
27 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, trans. Lewis Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
28 Halbwachs, 22. 
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memory.”29  This idea fundamentally contributed to the way I designed my project, and helped 
me identify which Salvadoran groups and institutions are in a position to successfully promote 
the narratives of their collective memories in the post-war era.  I decided to mainly explore the 
narratives of El Salvador’s two main political parties, ARENA and the FMLN (and to an extent, 
the military) because they are the most prominent and powerful institutions who can influence 
the narrative that is eventually communicated as history.    
Later theorists corroborated the idea of history as malleable, and elaborated upon the 
ways that collective memories are transmitted.  In particular, Hernhard Giesen and Kay Junge’s 
article “Historical Memory”30 discusses specific means through which groups transmit their 
particular understandings of history.  Giesen and Junge argue that historical memory “refers to 
some past episode that can be recounted in a narrative format… it is only within such a narrative 
frame that individual and collective identities can take form and be communicated.”31  They also 
discuss two principal modes of transmitting these narratives: through intentional attempts that 
serve to proactively “counteract oblivion,”32 and through non-intentional moments produced by 
objects, dates and places that passively invoke the past by “intrud[ing] on our minds.”33  
Intentional attempts are conducted by “social carriers of memory [who] store, imagine, and 
reproduce history in the name of their respective community,”34 while passive transmission 
occurs when citizens come into contact with objects or places that invoke recollections or 
mythologies about the past.  
                                                 
29 Peter Burke, “History as a Social Memory” in Jeffrey K. Olick, ed., The Collective Memory Reader (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 188-192.  
30 Bernhard Giesen and Kay Junge, “Historical Memory,” in Gerard Delanty and Engin F. Isin, ed., Handbook of 
Historical Sociology (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications Inc., 2003), 326-334. 
31 Giesen and Junge, 326. 
32 Giesen and Junge, 326. 
33 Giesen and Junge, 326. 
34 Giesen and Junge, 331. 
 18 
The collective memories of the four figures discussed in this paper are indeed reproduced 
through both of these forms of transmission.  The political right and left actively seek to transmit 
their respective narratives through writing books, giving political speeches, and building 
monuments and museums.  Because of their crucial role in constructing and transmitting 
narratives of history,  I sought out “social carriers of memory” such as politicians, professors and 
museum curators to interview for my project.  They are the ones who participate in this 
intentional communication process, so I felt that getting their perspectives would give particular 
insight into the intentionality of history’s construction and transmission.   It is also these carriers 
of memory who invest in the creation of spaces and objects that function as catalysts to passively 
invoke memories and particular narratives.  Objects such as monuments and street signs must be 
encountered by citizens and visitors in their daily lives, and serve as reminders that are passively 
absorbed by the observer. 
The last main theoretical idea that framed my thinking  in the development of this project 
was explored by Paloma Aguilar in her analysis of collective memory in the Spanish Civil War 
entitled Memory and Amnesia.35  She discusses the silencing of multiple narratives of history 
under Franco, and proceeds to describe the way a national consensus of history can be built in 
the wake of a collective trauma.  In my work, I consider the negotiated end of the Salvadoran 
Civil War to be the antithesis of the imposed dictatorship that resulted in Spain.  For that reason, 
the analysis of Aguilar’s work is necessarily comparative in the sense that there are more 
differences than similarities in the two cases.   
                                                 
35 Paloma Aguilar, Memory and Amnesia: The Role of the Spanish Civil War in the Transition to Democracy (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2002).   
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After the Spanish Civil War, Franco’s victorious Nationalists agreed that is was best to 
“silence the bitter voices of the past”36 and disallowed any recognition of the Republican cause 
or struggle.  Aguilar writes that  
After the Civil War, Spain was forced to face a panorama of divided memories.  
A large proportion of the memories of the losing side… resided in exile, and those 
that remained were silenced through repression and censorship… these memories 
only existed at a family level, and even then this was not always the case due to 
the fear of repression.37 
 
Because of this phobia of narrative difference, the Franco regime implemented a rigid system of 
socialization that silenced dissonant voices and imposed the narrative of events necessary to 
maintain power: 
Throughout the almost forty-year span of the régime, numerous rites were created 
that established a sense of continuity with a glorious ancestral past and with the 
spirit of victory relating to the Civil War.  However, this process of 
mythologisation witnessed a number of serious problems given that it evoked a 
rupture of national unity.  It is not possible to construct the founding myth of a 
nation on a division of this kind, at least not for long.38 
 
Though there was a perceived consensus in the sense that there were no opposing voices in the 
arena, it was an imposed and therefore illegitimate consensus that covered up rather than 
addressing the ruptured, fragmented understandings of events.  Aguilar describes the 
superficiality of national consensus under Franco saying 
The régime was never capable of bringing about real reconciliation because this 
would have undermined the foundations of its legitimacy by allowing the 
population to reach the conclusion that the war had been an unnecessary farce. 
 
True reconciliation cannot be reached without a degree of political openness that did not come 
about in Spain until after Franco’s death, but that began immediately after the peace negotiations 
                                                 
36 Aguilar, xx. 
37 Aguilar, 32. 
38 Aguilar, 137. 
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in El Salvador.  Aguilar’s book demonstrates that when national wounds are artificially covered, 
they must be reconciled with eventually because an imposed consensus is a false consensus. 
 In visiting El Salvador after reading Aguilar’s book, I began to see manifestations of the 
difference between a case of imposed consensus (i.e. Spain as described in Memory and 
Amnesia), and a country where no adequate consensus has been reached, but a variety of 
powerful institutions have the ability to promote and preserve their narratives.  Because of 
Aguilar’s analysis, I believe that the fragmentation of understanding in the Salvadoran case, 
exemplified by the figures discussed in Chapter 2, is in fact a healthy and necessary step towards 
a true reconciliation narrative, such as the one that emerged in Spain a half-century after their 
conflict.  In Spain’s case, the narrative of war as collective madness that implicates all and 
blames no-one has risen in prominence.39  Though a generally acceptable, unifying narrative is 
not yet evident in the Salvadoran case, I do believe that the two historical figures discussed in 
Chapter 3 show the beginnings of a shared understanding that cannot be come to without 
acknowledging the fragmented nature of a civil conflict. 
                                                 




During the summer of 2010, I traveled to El Salvador for five weeks to conduct 
interviews and make observations about the way that the four historical figures featured in my 
project are currently being articulated and represented in sites of memory, particularly museums 
and monuments.  I chose to interview people that I consider to be carriers of memory, and who 
are powerful enough to make an impact on the eventual historical narrative of the war.  Thanks 
to my father’s work, reputation, and connections as a former correspondent for the Washington 
Post, I had access to some of El Salvador’s leading thinkers and political actors, all of whom had 
an active roll in the conflict itself.  As a bilingual Salvadoran-American, I found myself in a 
special position to conduct this research as both an insider and an outsider.   
Ultimately, I was able to conduct fourteen interviews with: five current members of the 
FMLN who are part of Mauricio Funes’ administration, three university professors, two museum 
curators (one from the Museo de la Revolución in Morazán and the other from the Museo de la 
Palabra y la Imagen in San Salvador), one ARENA politician, one PDC politician, one military 
official, and one descendant of the coffee-growing oligarchy, who helped to found ARENA in 
the early 1980s.40   
I was able to network much more effectively within the Salvadoran left than with the 
right, so unfortunately the voices I catalogued in my interviews are overwhelmingly sympathetic 
to the FMLN and to more leftist ideologies.  In order to supplement the narrative of the right, I 
have included quotes taken from two texts written by former military officers: a military school 
textbook entitled In Defense of the Fatherland: A History of the Armed Conflict in El Salvador 
                                                 
40 For further information about individual interviewees, please consult Appendix (b).   
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1980-1992, by former general Humberto Corado Figueroa, and a combined testimony and 
political analysis entitled Profiles of the War by former general Juan Orlando Zepeda.  Though 
right-wing military history and political history are not one and the same I did not find adequate 
sources written by prominent right-wing thinkers outside of the military establishment.  
My interviews were semi-structured and I used the same prepared list of questions with 
politicians, military officers, and academics.  These including, “how would you explain the 
Salvadoran Civil War to someone with no knowledge of our country’s history?” and “I am 
focusing my project on [each of the four historical figures].  What was his roll in the conflict, and 
what does he mean today?”  However, I tailored some interviews, such as those with the museum 
curators and the politicians who were involved in constructing particular monuments, to their 
efforts to preserve or commemorate history.  They were all conducted in Spanish, and later 
translated.  Some were transcribed and translated by a paid Salvadoran transcriber, and others I 
processed myself.   
Also, some politicians had very strict time constraints and only allowed me to interview 
them for a few minutes.  In those circumstances, I limited my interview questions to those 
especially pertinent to his or her position in politics (i.e., I asked Commander Schafik Handal’s 
son, who today is a federal legislator, more specific questions about his father than about the 
other three figures).   
Though my methods fall short of encapsulating a full picture of El Salvador’s current 
political landscape, my small sample of interviewees includes some very powerful actors who 
belong to even more powerful institutions.  Thus their thoughts, opinions, and narrative 
interpretations of events are more likely to reflect the direction that official history is taking at 




 Colonel Monterrosa and Major d’Aubuisson 
 
In this chapter, I will discuss the competing narratives that simultaneously exist about 
Colonel Domingo Monterrosa and Major Roberto d’Aubuisson.  Polarized understandings of 
these two men are consistently divided between the political left and the political right, e.g. those 
who fought for the FMLN during the war, and those who either were part of the military, or 
sympathized with those who fought against the guerrillas.  These divisions demonstrate the stark 
polarization that continues to linger in post-war El Salvador.  However, it also demonstrates the 
relative openness that has resulted from the Peace Accord.  Because of the negotiated peace, 
institutions and political parties can hold up the figures they choose and though there may be 
backlash and dissent from other sectors of society, there is not an officially sanctioned silencing, 
as has occurred in the wake of other civil conflicts in the twentieth century.   
 Though there is inevitably some overlap in the descriptions of both d’Aubuisson and 
Monterrosa on the left and right, each of them is remembered in fundamentally different ways by 
each side.  Monterrosa is held up by conservatives and the military in particular as their greatest 
soldier, and as a martyr.  On the other hand, the left remembers him for leading his troops in the 
undertaking of several infamous massacres, among them the internationally recognized slaughter 
that occurred in El Mozote.  The FMLN also remembers and celebrates the intelligence operation 
that took his life.  Roberto d’Aubuisson similarly elicits responses polarized along political 
divisions.  Conservatives, both military and non-military, hail him for his key role in containing 
communist aggression and bringing democracy to El Salvador.  The left remembers him 
primarily for his role as the head of paramilitary death squads, and particularly as the intellectual 
architect of Archbishop Oscar Romero’s assassination in 1980.   
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 The narratives that exist about these two men are often dissonant and in some cases, 
directly contradictory.  This is in part because each of them is directly linked, through 
testimonial evidence, to some of the worst and most publicly recognized atrocities of the conflict, 
and yet their respective institutions do not condemn them, but rather lift them up as leaders who 
did what was necessary in difficult circumstances.  Their critics cannot look past the crimes that 
they are accused of, and because both of these men died decades ago, neither was brought to 
justice.  The societal wounds that they left behind remain unhealed and foster disharmony rather 
than reconciliation.   
 Though this project was not designed with the intention of arguing that right-wing figures 
are polarizing and left-wing figures are unifying, the United Nations Truth Commission Report, 
which compiled more than 22,000 victim statements,41 claims that 60% of the reported human 
rights violations were perpetrated by the armed forces; 25% were committed by police and the 
National Guard; 20% were committed by military escorts and in self-defense; 10 % were carried 
out by death squads; and only 5% were reported to have been committed by the FMLN.42 
Though ARENA and the military do not accept these figures, it is clear that the right wing 
carried out a disproportionate percentage of the violence as compared to the guerrillas, and thus 
there are few documented, high-profile cases of FMLN abuses that could be comparable either to 
the El Mozote massacre, or to Romero’s assassination.   
Colonel Domingo Monterrosa 
 Domingo Monterrosa Barrios, born in 1940, began his rise to prominence during his time 
at the Gerardo Barrios Military Academy as a teenager.  He stood out as one of the strongest and 
most charismatic of the tanda, or graduating class, of 1963.  After graduation, he taught at the 
                                                 
41 Spanish, Óscar Martínez Peñate, ed., El Salvador: Los acuerdos de paz y el informe de la comisión de la verdad 
(San Salvador: Editorial Nuevo Enfoque, 2007), 159. 
42 Martínez Peñate, 159. 
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academy before going on to be trained at the U.S. military base in Panama, and was chosen to 
learn special counter-insurgency strategies in Taiwan before returning to El Salvador in the early 
1970s.   After Colonel Arturo Molina took power in the controversial 1972 elections, Monterrosa 
became one of his closest friends and advisors, and thus one of the most powerful individuals in 
the country.43  
 During the conflict, Colonel Monterrosa was chosen to command the Atlacatl Battalion, 
the most elite of the rapid reaction units trained by the U.S. military.  Journalist Mark Danner 
describes his leadership saying, “Monterrosa seemed a soldier of the classic type: aggressive, 
charismatic, a man who liked nothing better than to get out in the field and fight alongside his 
troops.  The Salvadoran grunts… loved Monterrosa for his willingness to get down in the dirt 
with them and fight.”44  The colonel’s leadership earned him the respect and loyalty of many 
both inside and outside the military.   
 However, Monterrosa’s legacy is tainted because of the Atlacatl Batallion’s adherence to 
the belief that all civilians residing in guerrilla-controlled territories were indistinguishable from, 
and thus equally dangerous as guerrillas themselves.45  This idea resulted in several of the 
conflict’s most infamous massacres, in particular the annihilation of the entire town (save one 
survivor) of El Mozote in December, 1981.  The massacre claimed the lives of at least 800 
civilians, among them more than 400 children.46  This massacre, and others in the regions of 
Morazán and Chalatenango were actively denied for years both by the Salvadoran government 
and the U.S. Congress, who continued funding the Salvadoran armed forces despite reports of 
extreme human rights abuses such as these.   
                                                 
43 Mark Danner, “The Massacre at El Mozote,” The New Yorker 6 Dec. 1993, 56.    
44 Danner, 61.  
45 Danner, 59.   
46 For a full description of the atrocities committed in this massacre, please reference Danner’s article in full.  
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 In 1984, the ERP faction of the FMLN, which controlled the department of Morazán 
(under the direction of commander Joaquín Villalobos) developed a plan to kill Monterrosa 
which hinged on his obsession with the rebel radio station, Radio Venceremos (roughly 
translated as Radio We Shall Be Victorious), which broadcast from combat zones in the 
mountainous forests near the Honduran border.  Monterrosa considered the destruction of the 
radio station as vital to demoralizing and weakening the guerrilla movement.  He was also well 
known for keeping trophies from the sites of important military victories, and based on this 
knowledge, the FMLN designed a Trojan horse-style operation that they hoped would lure the 
officer into enemy territory.   
The guerrillas provoked a skirmish, allowed a fake transmitter filled with explosives to be 
captured by the army, and cut transmission in order to convince the military that they had truly 
captured Radio Venceremos.  In four long years of transmission, the radio had never before gone 
dead.  Military intelligence took this to mean that the transmitter had truly been abandoned.  
Once Colonel Monterrosa heard the news, he decided that he and his five closest military 
advisers would personally retrieve the transmitter in a helicopter.  With the radio equipment 
successfully captured and placed in the chopper, the colonel and his advisors took off with their 
trophy in tow.  From the ground, FMLN guerrillas detonated the explosives hidden inside the 
transmitter, and watched the helicopter, filled with elite military personnel, explode in the sky 
above the mountains.47   
 This event rocked the military establishment and energized guerilla forces across the 
country.  With the passing of time, Monterrosa has remained a central figure within military 
history.  The military museum honors him with his own exhibit, decorated with a floor-to-ceiling 
                                                 
47 As told in the FMLN oral history compilation: 
José Ignacio López Vigil, Rebel Radio: The Story of El Salvador’s Radio Venceremos, trans. Mark Fried 
(Willimantic, CT: Curbston Press, 1994).   
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portrait of the colonel, his uniform, and plaques explaining his excellence as an officer.  Current 
and former military personnel, as well as  many right-wing sympathizers, remember him as the 
best of the best, an example of excellence and a symbol of sacrifice.  His death is also considered 
to be an example of the barbarous tactics employed by the guerrillas, who refused to play by the 
rules of war. 
 For the FMLN, this story remains as one of the great moments in the mythology of the 
movement because it epitomizes their overarching David and Goliath narrative.  It is a story 
often retold in the region of Morazán, where the events took place.  The Museo de la Revolución 
(Museum of the Revolution) in Morazán even houses the remnants of the Colonel’s helicopter in 
a permanent outdoor exhibit.  Colonel Monterrosa is remembered in equal measure as a martyr 
and as a villain by sectors of society unwilling to compromise their own understanding of events, 
and thus parallel narratives are maintained by parallel institutions, particularly museums. 
 Though he is a divisive figure overall, some aspects of the narrative surrounding Colonel 
Monterrosa are consistent and unified, particularly his reputation as a good soldier and a 
charismatic leader.  Even his enemies during the war discuss these attributes.  For instance, 
Carlos Henriquez Consalvi, the head of Radio Venceremos who played an instrumental role in 
developing the plan that killed Monterrosa said of him that, “he was very upstanding and had a 
lot of military initiative.”48  Dagoberto Gutierrez, another former guerrilla also commented that  
In El Salvador’s cruel and total war, the government’s army had in Monterrosa its 
boldest, most audacious and hardworking leader. Us guerrilleros, we recognized 
hardworking leaders, we knew that they were the ones that woke up at 5 am and 
started moving their troops towards us. We knew that.  Monterrosa was one of 
those.49 
 
                                                 
48 Interview, Carlos Henriquez Consalvi. July 19, 2010. 
49 Interview, Dagoberto Gutierrez, July 29, 2010. 
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This sentiment was echoed in more than half of the twelve interviews that discussed Monterrosa 
from all across the military and political spectrum.  However, the right-wing and military 
interviewees celebrate him as a hero, while the left, particularly those interviewees who were 
formerly guerrillas, qualified their acknowledgements of his military prowess with mentions of 
the human rights violations he committed.   
 For the conservative sector of Salvadoran society, particularly the military, Colonel 
Monterrosa is often acclaimed as one of the best soldiers in history, and his death is considered 
to be particularly tragic.  For instance, Alfredo Mena Lagos, a conservative talk-show host and 
founding member of the ARENA political party, said of him that “he was an honest official.  He 
was effective, and he could have done a lot of good things for his country.  That’s why they 
killed him.”50  This sentiment was elaborated upon by General Mauricio Vargas, who served 
under him at the beginning of the conflict: 
I had the opportunity to meet him and work with him, so I can say that he was a 
man that established special civilian and military relationships.  He also harvested 
and supported the search for a resolution of the conflict.  His death was a very 
grave loss for the institution, he was a spearhead, a symbol. With his leadership a 
change occurred in the armed forces.  His death was very painful and it wasn’t 
only felt by the armed forces but also by the other sectors that he had worked 
with.51 
 
In official statements of military history, the same narrative is also reproduced.  This is most 
clearly seen in the following two examples, the first from the military school textbook In Defense 
of the Fatherland which states that: 
The [Atlacatl] battalion numbered more than a thousand soldiers under the 
command of Lt. Col. Domingo Monterrosa Barrios, who was later proclaimed by 
the voice of the people as a martyr and hero of the Fatherland.52 
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This text not only asserts Monterrosa’s martyrdom but also claims that his reputation as a hero is 
derived from popular mythology, perpetuated by the Salvadoran people rather than the military 
establishment.    
 The second and most overt example of how the military officially maintains the narrative 
of Colonel Monterrosa as a martyr is the permanent exhibit dedicated to him in the Museo 
Militar Ex-Cuartel El Zapote (the museum of military history, housed in a former barrack in the 
outlying San Salvador neighborhood of San Jacinto).  One entire room is dedicated to his 




At the entrance of the exhibit stands a plaque that reads: 
This exhibit is presented in memory of the one called, at the moment of his death, 
the Commander of the 3rd Infantry Brigade, born leader and brilliant fighter: Lt. 
Col DEM Domingo Monterrosa Barrios, a war hero who offered up his life in the 
fulfillment of his duty on the 23rd of October, 1984.  This man, a symbol of the 
military campaign undertaken between 1980 and 1992, brought glory to the pages 
of military history, and today we honor his memory.  
 
The exhibit features a floor-to-ceiling portrait of the officer, and many of his personal effects 
including his uniform, his medals, and his journals (pictured in Figure 2.2).  Nowhere in the 
exhibit are there descriptions either of the particular operations he was associated with, or the 
manner in which he was killed.   
                                                 





These omissions stand in stark contrast to the two-fold manner in which the left speaks 
about Colonel Monterrosa.  Rather than focus on his accomplishments, interviewees highlighted 
the human rights violations that he and the Atlacatl battalion committed, particularly in the 
department of Morazán, near the border with Honduras, as well as describing the operation in 
which he was killed.  For instance, Nidia Díaz, a former PRTC guerrilla and current 
representative to the Central American Congress described him saying, 
He was ruthless; he would drug his battalion so that they would commit the most 
atrocious of crimes.  Everyone feared the Atlacatl battalion for their unabashed 
brutality…. He had accumulated so much hatred among the revolutionary forces because 
he was responsible for the deaths of campesinos, of civilians, mostly.55 
 
This was similarly described by Carlos Henriquez Consalvi, who founded Radio Venceremos 
and was an active ERP guerrilla in Morazán.  Unlike Díaz, he specifically referenced the 
massacre at El Mozote: 
[Monterrosa] was named head of the Atlacatl Battalion, as we know, this battalion 
was involved in many massacres across the whole country but the worst and most 
emblematic one was the massacre of El Mozote which left a thousand peasants 
dead among them 400 young children.56 
 
                                                 
54 Author’s photo. January 2010. 
55 Interview, Nidia Díaz. August 9, 2010.   
56 Interview, Carlos Henríquez Consalvi.  July 19, 2010. 
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The colonel was similarly discussed by Ronaldo Cáceres, a former ERP guerrilla in Morazán 
who later founded the Museo de la Revolución (Museum of the Revolution) near the remains of 
El Mozote in the town of Perquín:   
This guy was a very effective military man, he ascended to becoming officer and 
wanted to be minister of defense.  The first elite battalion is sworn in on August 
15th 1981, the Atlacatl Battalion.  In December, between the 9 and 11, under his 
command, they committed the biggest massacre in our country, El Mozote.57  
 
These quotes illustrate the tendency for the left to describe Colonel Monterrosa in terms of the 
atrocities that his battalion committed and highlight the brutality of these acts.   
 Logically, those who belonged to the FMLN during the war also highlighted the 
operation in which Monterrosa was killed.  It is held up as a moment that particularly represents 
the innovation of the guerrillas in the face of an enemy armed and trained by the United States.  
For instance,  Carlos Henríquez Consalvi, who played a leadership role in the operation because 
he was the head of the clandestine radio station, described the event saying, 
The guerrilla sets up a trap as old as the Trojan horse and that is when he dies, in a 
helicopter that was taken down, along with other military chiefs, very close to 
where the massacre of El Mozote took place. His death was a very harsh blow to 
the military, and being that, it was also a point in favor of peace.58 
 
Others included even more detail in their account of Monterrosa’s death.  For instance, Nidia 
Díaz, a former PRTC guerrilla, gave a more extensive version of events: 
So in 1984, when he says that he has destroyed the radio station, he took the 
transmitter in his helicopter, but it was really a bomb.  It was an intelligence 
mission for the guerrillas that worked in the Western part of El Salvador… He 
took the radio as a trophy, but it exploded in his helicopter, and that’s how he 
died, that’s how the operation was.  It’s not that I’m happy about it, but I want to 
tell you that the day he died, the Salvadoran people felt a great sense of relief, the 
entire guerrilla force and much of the civilian population, because he really was 
very blood-thirsty… His death was felt by the powerful sectors of society because 
he was their best military strategist… but I don’t recognize anything positive 
about him.  Other people might, but in my case, I saw the people suffer because of 
                                                 
57 Interview, Rolando Cáceres.  July 30, 2010.   
58 Interview, Carlos Henríquez Consalvi.  July 19, 2010.   
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the horrific operations he conducted against the civilian population, so I can’t 
recognize any sort of merit. 59 
 
Beyond these testimonies about the importance of Monterrosa’s death, the gesture that 
symbolizes the left’s celebration of this strategic victory is the preservation of the helicopter’s 
remains at the Museo de la Revolución in Perquín, Morazán (pictured in Figure 2.3).  The 
director, Rolando Cáceres, describes the operation that killed the colonel, and why the museum 
continues to house the destroyed chopper: 
Monterrosa puts the transmitter on his lap and the helicopter climbs and as it nears 
a hill, [it] detonates and the helicopter is turned into a fireball that kills everyone 
inside on October 23rd 1984 at 16:00 hours in Joateca. The Trojan horse worked 
they tell us, we gave them the trophy and with the trophy came defeat. All the 
heads of Operation Torola 4 are killed in a single strategic move. This leaves us 
with a lesson as all war stories do, war is not won by the strongest but by the 
smartest. We kept the helicopter’s remains- what we did so that they would not be 
taken away was drop walls on them and hide them, because they took all the 
bodily remains, but we came back after the war and now we have the 
[helicopter’s] remains here.60 
 
 
Figure 2.361  
 
Overall, the left has a somewhat nuanced view of Monterrosa, as someone who possessed 
and was respected for his unrivalled military and strategic skills.  This view is simultaneously  
reconciled with the idea that he was a brutal killer, who was cold-hearted enough to kill civilians, 
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60 Interview, Rolando Cáceres.  July 30, 2010.  
61 Author’s photo.  July, 2010.   
 33 
especially children.  The following quote, articulated by Professor of Philosophy Ricardo Ribera, 
synthesizes the three primary narrative elements present in left-wing accounts of who 
Monterrosa was: 
From a military perspective, he was a very efficient soldier.  Of course he dies the 
victim of a booby trap… which contradicts his myth a bit, that he falls for the 
false radio transmitter.  Villalobos [the FMLN commander in Morazán] was more 
astute than he was.  That’s the trouble with his mythology.  From the public’s 
point of view, taking into account human rights abuses, he is the one responsible 
for the Mozote massacre, among many others.  So one has to ask, why have they 
picked him, why not look for someone else, since he has this shadow over him?  
Brilliant, but also one of the most heinous violators of human rights.62  
 
In this excerpt from his interview, Ribera acknowledges Monterrosa’s military skill, as well as 
mentioning both the manner in which he died and the atrocities he is associated with.   
The quotes above illustrate the way in which the right and the left have constructed 
parallel and competing narratives about Colonel Domingo Monterrosa.  On the one hand, he is 
among the most esteemed and revered figures in Salvadoran military history.  Simultaneously, 
the left holds firmly to the narrative of Monterrosa as one of El Salvador’s most brutal abusers of 
human rights, who achieved greatness through unforgivable means, and whose death brought 
relief to terrorized populations across the northern and western provinces.   
Major Roberto d’Aubuisson 
 Roberto d’Aubuisson Arrieta was born on August 23, 1943 to a middle-class family of 
French descent on the outskirts of San Salvador.  He was educated in a military academy and as 
a young man served in the National Guard, where he began training in national security and 
intelligence.  D’Aubuisson rose to greater prominence when Jorge Alberto Medrano, the 
National Guard’s commander, took him under his wing as his protégé in the 1960s.  During the 
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1970s, d’Aubuisson was chosen to study intelligence and security in Virginia, New York, 
Taiwan, Uruguay, and later on at the U.S. military base in Panama.63   
By the end of the 1970s, d’Aubuisson had reached the rank of Major.  In 1979, a pro-
reform military junta conducted a coup against President Carlos Humberto Romero, and in the 
process purged hard-line right-wing officers, including d’Aubuisson.  Despite being expelled 
from the military, he went on to found the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista, or ARENA 
(National Republican Alliance) political party in 1981.  It in turn became the political 
mouthpiece for the most conservative Salvadorans who fought against all kinds of political 
change, in particular agrarian reform.   
These same powerful interests also allegedly bankrolled paramilitary groups, known as 
death squads, to silence those who supported change.64  In particular, d’Aubuisson and the death 
squads have been linked through informal testimony to the assassination of Archbishop Oscar 
Arnulfo Romero (discussed more at length in Chapter 3).  This evidence came to light in 1987, 
when the get-away driver who assisted in killing the Archbishop came forward with his 
testimony.65 
Roberto d’Aubuisson was known simply as “The Major,” and began appearing on 
national television to denounce “subversives,” from school teachers to labor leaders to 
politicians.  Within days of his pronouncements, the corpses of these same individuals would 
most often be found disfigured and with signs of torture.  These killings became known as the 
signature modus operandi of the death squads, and d’Aubuisson’s connection to them was 
publicly known, but largely unspoken, for fear of retribution.  Despite  these associations, 
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d’Aubuisson enjoyed widespread popular support among people of all social and economic 
background because of his charisma and political skill.66   
During the 1980s, d’Aubuisson entered the political arena in earnest, serving as the 
president of El Salvador’s national Constituent Assembly in 1982 and 1983. In 1984, he ran for 
president as ARENA’s candidate, but narrowly lost to the Partido Demócrata Cristiano 
(Christian Democratic Party, or PDC) candidate José Napoleón Duarte.67 68  In the elections of 
1989, he abdicated his place as ARENA’s candidate, and the party ran Alfredo Cristiani instead, 
who was victorious over his PDC opponent. Though throughout the conflict, d’Aubuisson had 
been staunchly against negotiating with the guerrillas, he gradually changed his mind as the war 
went on, and supported President Cristiani’s participation in the peace talks between 1990 and 
the signing of the accords in 1992. 69  He died on February 20, 1992 after a long battle with 
throat cancer, scarcely a month after the Peace Accord was signed in Chapultepec, Mexico.   
The opinions expressed by interviewees show that d’Aubuisson was a multi-faceted and 
controversial figure who enjoyed both widespread popular support and complicity, while 
simultaneously engendering a deep-seated hatred within the FMLN and their supporters.  
Because of this, distinct narratives have emerged from the right and the left to explain his 
significance as a historical figure.  The right focuses on his accomplishments and leadership, 
while the left highlights the atrocities that he is associated with, much in the same way as they do 
in Colonel Monterrosa’s case.  
                                                 
66 Douglas Farah, “D’Aubuisson: Death Comes to the Executioner,” The Washington Post, February 23, 1992 
(LexisNexis).   
67 Severo, “Roberto d’Aubuisson.” 
68 However, these elections are not considered to be widely representative because there was a large movement to 
boycott the ballot among FMLN supporters. 
69 Severo, “Roberto d’Aubuisson.”   
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For ARENA and those less formally affiliated with the right-wing,  d’Aubuisson is 
primarily remembered for founding the party and for responding to the heightened communist 
threat that loomed after the Sandinista victory in neighboring Nicaragua. His friend and fellow 
founder of ARENA, Alfredo Mena Lagos described him saying, “He had his good side and his 
bad side.  He was a very charismatic leader.  However he was not very principled.  On the other 
hand, he was someone who helped contain communist aggression.”70 Similarly, Milagro Navas, 
an ARENA mayor from the San Salvador suburb of Antiguo Cuscatlán claimed that,  
I joined [ARENA] because Roberto d’Aubuisson had clear principles and ideas 
about what he wanted for our country.  These came about because of the dangers 
that there were during that time that socialism and communism could creep into 
our country… He was the maximum leader of our party.  Those of us who love 
ARENA, the ones who love our country, remember him with that sort of 
fondness. 71 
 
This was also stated in the memoir of General Orlando Zepeda who wrote that, 
 
D’aubuison [sic]…became the hero of the right, he was the standard-bearer in 
both the civilian and military fight against the communist threat, the political-
social phenomenon named D’aubuisson [sic] wrote himself into our nation’s 
history; later, with a group of other concerned civilians, he founds the Alianza 
Republicana Nacionalista [ARENA], a political movement that managed to 
strengthen and organize the democratic right wing, which had previously been 
unstable and in the midst of an institutional crisis.72 
 
Other right-wing quotes mention d’Aubuisson’s alleged involvement with death squads and the 
accusations of his responsibility for Archbishop Romero’s assassination.  For instance, Mayor 
Milagro Navas went on to say that, “I think the Major needs to be remembered.  What happened 
is that they accused him of all kinds of things, including that he ordered the killing of Monseñor 
Romero, which we all know, well at least I believe, isn’t true.”73 Similarly, when General 
                                                 
70 Interview, Alfredo Mena Lagos, August 12, 2010.   
71 Interview, Milagro Navas. July 26, 2010 
72 Spanish, General Juan Orlando Zepeda Herrera, Perfiles de la guerra en El Salvador. (San Salvador, El Salvador: 
NewGraphics, 2008), 81.   
73 Interview, Milagro Navas. July 26. 2010. 
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Mauricio Vargas discussed Major d’Aubuisson, he did describe him as the founder of ARENA, 
and also hesitantly mentioned the accusations against him saying 
[d’Aubuisson] forms the political party that rules the country over four terms, 
twenty years.  He becomes a symbol for the right, specifically the more 
conservative right… He is accused of death squads and of many things, but what I 
know about it is hearsay and what I’ve read, but I don’t know for sure… I don’t 
know whether any of it is true or not.74  
 
It is only in these limited ways that the right wing tenuously alludes to the darker side of 
d’Aubuisson’s legacy.  Unsurprisingly, these are the same elements that are emphasized by his 
enemies, who hope to discredit the mythology of d’Aubuisson as a national hero. 
 Former and current members of the left have a generally unified understanding of who 
d’Aubuisson was.  Though he is often recognized as an important and intelligent leader, the 
alleged atrocities he is associated with overshadow his merits.  For instance Professor Ricardo 
Ribera of the Jesuit Central American University said of him that,  
One always speaks well of the deceased, but even dead everyone speaks badly of 
d’Aubuisson.  Those were terrible times… and we can’t dump all the atrocities on 
one person.  He was not just a genocidal torturer, but also an intelligent guy, a 
political animal… Of course he was probably the intellectual author of Romero’s 
assassination, but he was also an important leader in the peace process.75 
 
Similarly, Nidia Díaz, former PRTC guerrilla and current member of the Central American 
Congress, described him saying that, 
For us, d’Aubuisson was the founder first of the death squads and later of 
ARENA.  He was such an ideologue, terrible, he was against the people… he was 
intolerant.  He refused to have any sort of dialogue at the beginning, though by 
the end of the war he supported negotiation… Within his party, he was the 
prevailing voice.  Though he changed his mind, he originally did not favor a 
political solution, he saw the proponents of dialogue as enemies…  He was a 
leader, even though he didn’t have much money, he became the number one 
defender of the oligarchy’s interests.  He worked for the oligarchy so they would 
finance the death squads… He even had fascist tendencies.76 
                                                 
74 Interview, Mauricio Vargas.  July 19, 2010.   
75 Interview, Ricardo Ribera. August 9, 2010. 
76 Interview, Nidia Díaz. August 8, 2010.  
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This was expressed in more Marxist terms by Dagoberto Gutierrez, former PCES guerrilla and 
current professor at the Lutheran Univesity of El Salvador: 
He was very smart… you know the leader is the one that expresses the 
psychology of a part of society…. He became an instrument of the oligarchy and 
his methods, the death squads and his repressive agents, did nothing more than to 
stress the political regime of this country.  In this country there has never been a 
consensus…. He formed a party that served as an instrument of the dominant 
class and unified it under the classes’ control.77 
 
Gerson Martínez, a former FPL guerrilla and current Minister of the Interior, also stated that,  
He did not come up with death squadrons in the country. Way before his time, 
things like that were already happening here… but I think the fact that dishonored 
him the most was his participation in the assassination of Monseñor Romero.78 
 
Overall, the left remembers Major d’Aubuisson as a successful and charismatic politician, but his 
ties to the death squads, and particularly the accusation that he ordered Archbishop Romero’s 
assassination provoke such a degree of hatred that his positive legacy is significantly 
overshadowed.   
Both sides still actively promote their narratives, and on some occasions, these collide 
head-on. One site where this conflict plays out is the traffic circle in Antiguo Cuscatlán built for 
d’Aubuisson in 2006.  The monument on the circle has four sides, each emblazoned with one of 
the Major’s signature slogans: “Fatherland Yes!  Communism No!”; “First El Salvador, Second 
El Salvador, Third El Salvador”; “Present for the Fatherland!”; and “The most powerful weapon 
that free men possess is the vote.”  In the middle stands a towering flag pole with the Salvadoran 
flag waving at the top.  Every year on the anniversary of Archbishop Romero’s death, protesters 
gather at this monument to remind the world of d’Aubuisson’s involvement, and on this occasion 
in 2010, the monument was defaced (pictured in Figure 2.5).  The graffiti consisted of the spray-
                                                 
77 Interview, Dagoberto Gutierrez. July 19, 2010.   
78 Interview, Gerson Martínez. July 21, 2010.   
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painted outline of a body on the ground, and the words Asesino quien, roughly translated as “who 
are you calling an assassin?”79 written across the base.  
 The defacement of d’Aubuisson’s monument nicely juxtaposes manifestations of the two 
narratives, and illustrates the passion with which each side holds on to their own beliefs.  The 
monument itself serves to promote the narrative of d’Aubuisson as a hero, specifically as El 
Salvador’s number one patriot, and as the father of democracy.  The graffiti in turn is a reminder 
that others remember him as the great assassin, who ordered the death of countless Salvadorans, 





Colonel Monterrosa and Major d’Aubuisson illustrate cases where clear-cut, oppositional 
narratives have emerged.  For the right-wing, both are hailed as heroes due to the exceptional 
skills they each possessed, Monterrosa as a military strategist, and d’Aubuisson as a politician.  
The main trope used by the right to discuss Monterrosa is that he died a martyr, and that he was a 
                                                 
79 I interpret this to be a reference to the manner in which d’Aubuisson described the guerrillas during the war, as 
assassins and killers.   
80 Photo by Luis Romero, Associated Press.  Personal Collection. 
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model figure to be emulated by future generations of soldiers.  On the left, some such as 
Professor Ricardo Ribera of the Jesuit Central American University (UCA), are disappointed that 
the military has chosen Monterrosa as their exemplary figure.  He expressed this to me saying,  
One has to wonder, why did they pick him, why not someone else without that 
shadow?... It’s not so much that there weren’t other heroes, it reflects the ideology 
of the military to have picked him, it’s a case of ideological belligerence… it’s 
too bad because future generations of the military will have to carry that legacy 
placed upon them by the war-time leaders.  It’s ideological belligerency, it’s 
saying, if they accuse us of violating human rights, let’s hold up the greatest of 
the violators, let’s build him a statue, it’s challenging the construction of true 
democracy, it’s a battle of symbology…  In the long run, it will be a dishonor for 
the military to hold up those who violate human rights.81 
 
Though many interviewees from all across the political spectrum recognized Monterrosa’s 
extraordinary abilities as an officer, the left cannot accept him because he and his battalion are 
credibly linked to numerous atrocities that occurred during the war. 
Similarly, D’Aubuisson is recognized by all as a charismatic figure who was able to 
bring unity to the right.  Because he founded ARENA, the party and their followers continue to 
describe him as the ultimate politician and hold him up as a founding father who was unfairly 
accused of committing (or ordering) crimes perpetrated by the death squads, in particular 
Romero’s assassination.  However, it is unlikely that he will become a generally accepted or 
unifying figure because of these accusations, grounded in testimonial evidence, that the left 
continually turn to. 
Though it is unlikely that either of these men will be collectively forgotten in the near 
future, neither is it likely that they will become pan-political national icons as both the military 
and ARENA hope.  The divisions in Salvadoran society are too deep, and the conflict is too 
recent, for people who are linked with war crimes to be forgiven and held up through a  national 
consensus.  Also, because both of these men are deceased, it is easier for mythologies to emerge 
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about them, and yet they cannot be brought to justice.  Thus those who remember or 
experienced the crimes that Monterrosa and d’Aubuisson allegedly committed will never  find 
the kind of closure needed for the national wounds to heal.   
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Chapter 3  
Unified (and Potentially Unifying) Narratives: 





While some figures such as Roberto d’Aubuisson and Domingo Monterrosa remain 
irreconcilably divisive, others have to potential to bring people together. In this chapter, I will 
discuss the consistent, or unified, patterns I saw in narratives concerning Archbishop Oscar 
Romero and Commander Schafik Jorge Handal, pictured in Figure 3.1.  I will also consider 
evidence that these narratives have the power to be potentially unifying.  It is important to 
distinguish between unified and unifying narratives, because though they are interrelated, they 
are not interchangeable terms.  In the context of this project, I consider that unified narratives are 
common understandings or interpretations of historical figures that are articulated by people 
across the political spectrum, who may have even played militarily oppositional roles in the civil 
conflict.  This is in contrast to the competing narratives described in the preceding chapter, that 
do not allow for a common understanding, and do not foster healing. 
                                                 
82 Author’s photo. Graffiti in San Salvador, July 2007.   
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Unified, common understandings have the potential to become unifying narratives or 
interpretations that can function as part of the post-war reconciliation process.  If people can 
recognize that there is some common ground in place, it could be the starting point for dialogue 
about the divisive aspects of the war.  There is some evidence that this is beginning to happen in 
the cases of Romero and Handal, through the acceptance of commemorative events and public 
sites of memory (in these cases, monuments).  Though it is difficult to measure the degree to 
which a society has a unified understanding of its history, I believe that the allowance of public 
and permanent commemorations of these two figures demonstrates a tacit agreement on the part 
of their former enemies to recognize their historical importance with minimal challenges. 
In this chapter, I will show that Archbishop Romero is consistently remembered as (a) the 
voice of the voiceless, and (b) as a universal religious and moral guide or compass.  Commander 
Schafik Handal is also remember in a two-fold way as (a) a key negotiator during the peace 
process, and (b) as a consistent, honest politician in the post-war period. The universally 
appealing qualities that are used to describe these figures, as a defender of human rights and a 
peace negotiator respectively, and as champions of democracy, show possible pieces of a future 
reconciliation narrative that can only be developed over the passage of generations.   
Archbishop Oscar Romero 
“Every war in itself is dehumanizing, but Romero’s voice was a call to keep our humanity even 
in the direst of circumstances. We all revere Monseñor Romero, I am a Christian, but even those 
who aren’t, revere him.” –Gerson Martínez (Minister of the Interior, FMLN) 
 
The image of Archbishop Oscar Romero is among the most pervasive in El Salvador.  
His face is graffiti-ed on public buildings, hung in the offices of political officials, painted on the 
sides of churches and displayed on the walls of people’s homes.  Every year on March 24th, 
millions of Salvadorans around the world hold vigils, services, concerts and other events to 
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remember his assassination, mid-homily, during the most gruesome period of state-sponsored 
repression in El Salvador.  Today, a copper colored statue of the martyred priest stands at San 
Salvador’s central intersection, a controversial yet accepted reminder of the conflict that ravished 
the nation for twelve long years.  
Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero was assassinated in 1980 for his public 
denouncement of violence, particularly state-sponsored repression.  Romero became Archbishop 
of San Salvador as government repression against protestors and activists swelled during the late 
1970s.  Though he was originally a moderate priest with conservative tendencies, he became 
increasingly critical of the repression he witnessed against civilians, activists, and clergy.  He 
began to speak out against the repression after the murder of his friend and fellow cleric, Rutilio 
Grande in 1977.  His homilies, broadcast by radio across the nation, called for all factions to end 
violence, and preached a divine preference for the poor. He repeatedly called soldiers to disobey 
orders to kill, and to desert the military.83  
Romero’s weekly radio addresses made him many enemies, both within the Catholic 
church and among conservatives, who considered his teachings inflammatory and out of line.  
Other Salvadoran bishops even went so far as to send a secret letter to the Vatican, reporting his 
"politicized" activities and claiming he was unfit for his high position in the church.84  He was 
assassinated on March 24th, 1980 during one such homily by an unidentified sniper, who fired a 
shot from a Volkswagen parked outside the Divina Providencia chapel, as described in the 
United Nations Truth Commission Report.  The Truth Commission also concludes that it was 
“the ex-major Roberto d’Aubuisson who gave the order to assassinate the Archbishop, and gave 
precise instructions to members of his security detail, who acted as a ‘death squad’, to organize 
                                                 
83 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/elsalvador2.htm 
84 U.S. Catholic, Oscar Romero: Bishop of the Poor.  http://www.uscatholic.org/culture/social-
justice/2009/02/oscar-romero-bishop-poor (March 20, 2011). 
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and supervise the assassination’s execution.”85  No one has yet been brought to justice for his 
death.  
As the oligarchy celebrated his assassination as a victory for the existing social order, his 
martyrdom convinced many staunch believers in non-violent resistance that a better future could 
only be achieved through armed revolution, and support for the FMLN swelled after his death.  
For some, this event marks the beginning of the armed conflict.  Throughout the war he was 
invoked by the guerrilla movement as a martyr who symbolized the death of peaceful social 
reconciliation, while the military and oligarchy considered his assassination a victory against the 
forces of change by eliminating “la voz de los sin voz” (the voice of the voiceless). He and other 
priests who spread the doctrine of Liberation Theology were instrumental in awakening class 
consciousness among poor rural communities.  
 Today, thirty-one years since his death, the memory of Archbishop Romero is in the 
process of becoming unifying rather than divisive.   He did not officially represent any of the 
factions that fought the war; rather, he was a cultural figure speaking out for peace and social 
justice.  Because he chose to ally himself with the poor and the voiceless rather than with a 
particular political organization, and fought with words rather than weapons, he is becoming 
accepted by most sectors of Salvadoran society as a symbol of peace that must be upheld and 
remembered. He is a figure of both national and international importance, who highlights the role 
of progressive sectors within the Salvadoran Catholic Church in mobilizing against injustice, 
both in his own time and in the present day. 
In many of the interviews I conducted during July and August of 2010, I found evidence 
of a unified narrative emerging around the figure of Romero.  Based on my interviews, I have 
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identified two over-arching tropes that are used repeatedly to discuss Romero’s significance in 
both life and death: Romero as the “voice of the voiceless” and  Romero as a non-partisan, 
spiritual and moral guide.  The first of these represents a feeling that the specific values he stood 
for (preference for the poor) and the actions he took (speaking out to defend the oppressed) were 
universal human values lost in the madness of war. The second encompasses the sentiment that 
Romero was an apolitical figure, who should be embraced by Salvadorans of all political stripes.  
These two elements, one with specific reference to his beliefs and one that describes his 
universal representation of the Salvadoran nation, work together to construct Romero as a 
unifying post-war figure.  Logically there are those who belong to the extreme right wing, and to 
particular sectors of the military who speak of Romero as being a political instrument who 
sympathized with the communist cause.  However, the majority of my interviewees, whether 
current FMLN members,  former FMLN members, or moderate conservatives, spoke of Romero 
using the “voice of the voiceless” and “spiritual guide” tropes described above.   
 The verbatim phrase la voz de los sin voz, or the “voice of the voiceless” appeared time 
and again in my research.  Even when individuals did not use the exact words, all of the ten 
interviewees who answered questions about Romero86 discussed the archbishop’s role as a 
mouthpiece or speaker in some way, including his critics.  It is clear that Romero’s public 
homilies, preached over the radio and in churches all over El Salvador during his three years as 
Archbishop, brought him fame in his own time and established the beginning of his historical 
legacy.   
                                                 
86 Some interviews were tailored to the interviewee’s specialty or particular knowledge for the sake of time and 
efficiency.  Politicians Milagro Navas (ARENA) and Jorge Schafik Handal Vega (FMLN) had very limited 
schedules and could only speak with me for between ten and twenty minutes, so I focused my questions on the 
figures they were best acquainted with, Roberto d’Aubuisson and Schafik Jorge Handal, respectively.  Similarly, I 
focused my interview with museum curator Roland Cáceres on the Museo de la Revolución, which he founded, and 
thus questions about Romero were not addressed.   
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 Romero’s voice and role as a speaker are discussed by many as being important both in 
life and in death.  His homilies set him apart in life from other religious figures because, in the 
words of former PCES guerrilla and current professor Dagoberto Gutierrez, “he sided with the 
weak and confronted the powerful,”87 and, as articulated by former ERP guerrilla and current 
museum curator Carlos Henriquez Consalvi, because “when they heard him, they heard 
themselves.” 88  
Also, some interviewees such as former FPL guerrilla and current Minister of the Interior 
Gerson Martínez consider that his speaking was one element among other symbolic gestures that 
he made in order to take a stand against violence: 
They’re killing his church, so he stops attending officer’s events as a sign of 
mourning and starts being the voice of the people that lacked one. He then starts 
writing poetry, and I say that in best way possible because most of Romero’s 
homilies are the most beautiful and refined literature, really a thing of beauty. 
They had increasing bravery and human sensibility. This was a Romero with great 
fears, but when he spoke for the weak he was transformed, he became much 
braver.89 
 
His alliance with the poor, as demonstrated through his nationally broadcast homilies, was the 
gesture that ensured Romero’s enduring place in the Salvadoran collective memory.   
 The importance of Romero’s voice is also highlighted by the fact that he was assassinated 
mid-homily, and that the sharp-shooter’s bullet literally cut short the words of the Archbishop as 
he prepared to administer the Eucharist.  Interviewees repeatedly asserted that Romero’s death 
was directly tied to his outspokenness, and that when his voice was censored, the conflict 
escalated. The following quotes explain that Romero was targeted because he spoke in ways that 
were deemed dangerous by the powerful sectors of Salvadoran society.  Professor Dagoberto 
Gutierrez, a former guerrilla, expressed this saying: 
                                                 
87 Interview, Prof. Dagoberto Gutierrez. July 19, 2010.  
88 Interview, Carlos Henriquez Consalvi. July 19, 2010.   
89 Interview, Gerson Martínez. July 21, 2010. 
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When Monseñor Romero said in his last homily, ‘In the name of God, I ask of 
you, I beg you, I order you; stop repressing, stop killing your brothers,’ it was a 
message to the National Guard, the military and the repressive bodies. That was 
the moment when the right wing of this country knew they had to kill him. 90  
 
This was echoed by Eduardo Linares, former FPL guerrilla and current Director of the 
Salvadoran State Intelligence Organization: 
“He became a spokesman for the poor… So the [oligarchy] got confused.  They thought 
that by silencing Monseñor, people would stop rising up.  But they were wrong.  The 
opposite happened.”91  
 
 Even some of those who do not speak favorably of Romero discuss him in terms of his 
role as a spokesman.  For instance Mauricio Vargas, a military officer who belongs to an 
institution that does not generally uphold Romero as a positive symbol, said of him that, 
“Monseñor was a pastor and we can see from his homilies that he preached what we call the 
church’s social doctrine a lot. I don’t know if it was the right time or if the tone in which it was 
delivered were correct, but what is clear is that it was the church’s social doctrine.”92  Despite 
expressing his reservations about praising Romero, Vargas emphasizes his homilies and his 
preaching as the key aspects of the archbishop’s role in the conflict.   
 I also interviewed Alfredo Mena Lagos, a conservative talk-show host and descendent of 
the coffee-growing oligarchy who openly criticized the archbishop, saying that “Romero was a 
guerrilla mouthpiece, he was their instrument… To be honest, I have very little respect for 
Monseñor Romero.  He distanced himself from his pastoral duties and got mixed up in politics, 
he allowed himself to be used by the guerrillas.”93  Once again, despite his open distaste for 
Romero, Mena Lagos refers to him as a “mouthpiece” and as an “instrument.”  Though these 
                                                 
90 Interview, Prof. Dagoberto Gutierrez. July 19, 2010.   
91 Interview, Eduardo Linares. July 26, 2010.   
92 Interview, Mauricio Vargas. July 19, 2010 
93 Interview, Alfredo Mena Lagos. August 12, 2010 
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terms are meant in a derogatory fashion, it is clear that it was Romero’s role as a speaker that 
stood out in the minds of both his supporters and his critics. 
  The second clear trope that emerged from my research about Romero was his current 
role as a transcendent moral guide for all Salvadorans.  Though this is a narrative almost 
exclusively promoted by the left-wing people I interviewed, and it is not one that is openly 
supported by conservatives, the mythology of Romero as a universal Salvadoran conscience is 
bolstered by the public ways his life and death are commemorated. Though the right-wing does 
not necessarily support these celebrations of Romero, they do not challenge them, and through 
their silence they are tacit to the promotion of his legacy.   
 In my interviews, the trope of a non-partisan moral guide was not expressed in one 
unified way.  However, the overall message is clear even when different words are used to 
express similar ideas.  For instance, Carlos Henriquez Consalvi, former FMLN guerrilla and 
current director of the Museo de la Palabra y la Imagen (Museum of the Word and the Image), 
describes that “[Romero]  becomes a torch, a spiritual leader, to a big part of the country, most of 
all the poorest and most ostracized… he increasingly continues to be a bastion of morality and 
spirituality for our country.”94 This sentiment was reiterated by Violeta Menjívar, another former 
guerrilla and current Vice-Minister of Health, saying, “we understand his actions as Christian, 
ethical, religious, critical of the lack of democracy and the rampant violation of human rights.  
He emerges as the… most emblematic figure of El Salvador.”95  A similar statement was given 
by former guerrilla and current Director of the Salvadoran State Intelligence Service, Eduardo 
Linares, who says that, “Monseñor Romero turns into the spiritual guide for all of us, even for 
the guerrillas, without having been an FMLN commander, without belonging to any popular 
                                                 
94 Interview, Carlos Henriquez Consalvi. July 19, 2010. 
95 Interview, Violeta Menjivar. August 8, 2010. 
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organizations.  It’s because he was an ally of the poor.”96  These quotes give a dual definition to 
Romero’s transcending leadership, as both a religious man and as a moral figure.  These two 
elements come together to construct him as El Salvador’s conscience who wrote and spoke a 
truth thirty years ago that still resonates today.   
Also, there repeatedly appeared clarifications that Romero’s convictions came from his 
religious rather than political beliefs, especially among former and current members of the 
FMLN.   Violeta Menjívar (current Vice-Minister of Health) states the he acted “from his 
religious perspective, not as a partisan person.”97 Professor Ricardo Ribera (exiled during the 
war for his left-wing sympathies) says that he spoke out “not from a partisan perspective, but 
rather based on the gospel.”98  Similarly, Professor Dagoberto Gutierrez (former member of the 
FMLN and signer of the Peace Accords) argues that, “he is not a man with a left wing 
history…He is a product of the people,”99 much in the same way as former guerrilla, signer of 
the Peace Accords, and current moderate politician (member of the Social Democratic Party), 
Ana Guadalupe Martínez, who says that “it’s not that he was a revolutionary; he was just the 
leader of the church at the time of the peak of the conflict.”100 All of these demonstrate a clear 
pattern of emphasizing that Romero was not allied with any particular group, and that his 
teachings should be interpreted as universal, Christian messages, not as political statements. 
I also found this to be true in one interview with a conservative, General Mauricio 
Vargas, another signer of the Peace Accords, who described Romero saying,  
His role was that of a pastor.  I think in the moment there was not enough 
understanding of the message that Monseñor Romero spoke.  I don’t mind saying 
today that there were also some who made use of his preaching, of his homilies to 
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98 Interview, Ricardo Ribera. August 9, 2010 
99 Interview, Dagoberto Gutierrez. July 19, 2010. 
100 Interview, Ana Guadalupe Martínez. July 21, 2010. 
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further their political perspectives… but this does not mean that he was a 
Marxist… he just preached the church’s social doctrine.101  
 
Though there are some Salvadorans such as conservative television host Alfredo Mena Lagos 
who still vociferously claim that Romero is held up without merit, all of the rest of my 
interviewees at least begrudgingly accepted the importance of his role as a speaker and the 
impact on his death.  Again, quoting from my interview with General Mauricio Vargas, 
“[Romero]’s death was a very harsh blow because no one in their right mind could accept that 
this could be done to someone in any society.  I think that the brutal way in which he died was 
not acceptable from any point of view.” In this sense, people across most of the political 
spectrum speak to Romero’s key role in the conflict, and recognize his death as emblematic of 
the extreme violence that reached its apex in the early 1980s.   
This dual narrative of Romero as the voice of the voiceless, and as a non-partisan 
moral/spiritual guide is not only spoken about, but is also activated through public acts and 
spaces.  Constructing Romero as a universal, unifying figure is a project that the FMLN is 
actively engaged in through acts such as publicly commemorating his assassination, and building 
structures in his honor.  Though there are numerous examples of the ways and moments in which 
Romero is remembered and invoked, here I will discuss the 2002 erection of a statue to the 
archbishop, as well as his invocation by current president Mauricio Funes in his 2009 
inauguration speech.  And though perhaps ARENA, as a conservative party whose founder is 
accused of ordering Romero’s assassination, may not join in actively celebrating him, their silent 
allowance and acceptance of such acts renders them tacit in his promotion as a unifying national 
figure.   
                                                 
101 Interview, Mauricio Vargas. July 19, 2010.  
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On March 24, 2002, exactly twenty-two years after Archbishop Romero’s assassination, 
the Catholic church and the FMLN joined together to build a statue of him in the capital city.102  
The monument, pictured in Figure 3.2, is a head-to-toe likeness of the cleric made of copper  that 
stands on a concrete pedestal reading,  
¡Qué bien responden los pueblos cuando se les sabe amar! 
-Monseñor Romero, 21 de enero 1980 
XXII Aniversario de su Martirio, 1980-2002 
San Salvador 24 de marzo del 2002 
 
which can be loosely translated as “How well do the peoples of the world respond when they are 
shown love!”  It was built during Hector Silva’s time as mayor of San Salvador, the second in a 
series of four FMLN mayors who held the position from 1994 to 2009.   
However, the most important attribute of this statue is not its size or its inscription, which 
promotes love and universal brotherhood.  Rather, its location in the heart of San Salvador, at the 
intersection of Boulevard Constitución and Alameda Franklin Delano Roosevelt in the shadow of 
the Salvador del Mundo monument highlights the importance of this symbol.  The centrality of 
Romero’s statue, next to the city’s main plaza, reinforces the message that Romero belongs as a 
centerpiece of Salvadoran history.  The fact that the erection of this statue was allowed in such a 
pivotal public space indicates his high degree of public acceptance as a national figure.   
The Salvador del Mundo monument, a likeness of Christ standing atop the world, is the 
most important national monument because it represents El Salvador as a nation.103  It is also 
significant that Romero stands directly under the gaze of Christ, in a position that suggests his 
symbolic status as a man near to God.  Since Romero has been in consideration for full 
                                                 
102 Spanish, Francisco Mejía, “Erigen estatua en memoria de Mons. Romero,” El Diario de Hoy, March 24, 2002.  
(http://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/2002/3/24/nacional/nacio13.html). 
103 El Salvador’s full official name is “El Salvador del Mundo” which directly translates as “The Savior of the 
World.” The statue of Christ asserts the country’s status as a Christian nation.  
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canonization by the Vatican since 2000,104 it  makes sense that he would be placed in the position 
of a saint, just beneath Christ.  This reinforces the narrative of Romero as a universal, Christian, 
moral guide, practically akin to Jesus himself.  Equating Romero with Christianity also pressures 
conservative sectors, which often define themselves as upholding Catholic values, to accept him 
as a religious, rather than a politicized, figure. 
 
Figure 3.2105 
This narrative is further reinforced by those in the FMLN who invoke Romero during 
political moments.  One outstanding invocation occurred on June 1st, 2009, during the 
presidential inauguration address of the FMLN’s Mauricio Funes.  About half way through his 
first speech to the nation as president, Funes stated that:  
Our faith, our ethics, and our philosophy are not enough by themselves, they are 
empty if we do not  apply them concretely to the actions of our government.  For 
this reason, governing well is the maximum expression of commitment to our 
people, and to the memory of Monseñor Oscar Arnulfo Romero, my teacher and 
the spiritual guide of this nation. 106 
 
                                                 
104 “Salvadoran bishops write Vatican to support Romero’s sainthood,” Catholic News Service 
(http://www.uscatholic.org/news/2010/02/salvadoran-bishops-write-vatican-support-romeros-sainthood). 
105 http://v19.lscache1.c.bigcache.googleapis.com/static.panoramio.com/photos/original/906907.jpg 
106 Spanish, Mauricio Funes, “Discurso, Toma de Posesión, 1 de junio de 2009,” 
http://salvapress.wordpress.com/2009/06/01/presidente-mauricio-funes/ (April 2, 2011). 
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Here, Funes calls upon the narrative trope of Romero as a transcendent, universal moral leader, 
on the grounds of his spiritual authority.  Seeing such a reference in one of the most important 
public declarations of 2009, without provoking significant backlash, is once again an indication 
that Romero is in the process of being an acceptable historical reference, despite having been a 
contested public figure.   
  Both the tropes of Romero as (a) the voice of the voiceless, and (b) as a transcendent 
spiritual guide are perpetuated through narratives shared in private, such as my interviews, and 
simultaneously promoted through articulations and actions that occur in the public sphere.  Even 
if it is principally the FMLN and their sympathizers who invoke Romero using these tropes, they 
are increasingly joined by moderates such as General Mauricio Vargas, and supported by the 
silence of the right-wing.  There is not an active, widely accepted narrative that defends 
Romero’s assassination, in comparison with the polarizing figures described in the previous 
chapter.  Most will at least admit that Romero’s killing was an excessive war-time atrocity.  
Increasing numbers of young people are growing up surrounded by a positive image and 
narrative of Romero.  This portrayal of a godly man, shot down while speaking for the voiceless, 
emphasizes the war as a moment of indefensible madness, recognized in hindsight as such with 
Romero as the central martyr in this potentially unifying narrative.   
Commander Schafik Jorge Handal 
“Can Schafik become a great unifying myth?  I think so.” –Prof. Ricardo Ribera 
“He is a symbol that, like to or not, serves as a reference for new generations… he is a role 
model.”  -Gen. Mauricio Vargas 
 
Schafik Jorge Handal was born to Palestinian immigrants in 1930, and began 
participating in anti-dictatorial protests at the age of thirteen.  He continued his role as an activist 
throughout his time as a law student at the National University of El Salvador, as an advocate for 
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increased university autonomy as well as constitutional reform.  His vocal role in these activities 
led to  his expulsion from the country at the age of twenty-one, and when he returned five years 
later, he ascended the ranks of the clandestine Communist Party (PCES) to become the Secretary 
General in 1956.  This led to his brief exile once more in 1960, and when he returned a few 
months later, he resumed his activities as part of the PCES leadership.  He was once again 
selected as Secretary General in 1973, and he held that position throughout the conflict, until 
1994.107 
 During the 1970s, the PCES split following disagreements between Handal and fellow 
communist leader Salvador Cayetano Carpio over whether there were still non-violent avenues to 
pursue in order to prevent a civil war, or whether the moment had arrived for an armed 
revolution.  Carpio’s strong belief in taking up arms in order to fight the state-sponsored 
repression led him to form the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), and thus began the 
fragmentation of the left that led to the eventual creation of the ERP, the PRTC, and the RN.108  
Handal and the PCES continued to engage mainly in legal electoral and trade union organizing.  
However, as the repression worsened and non-violent means of resistance did not yield results, 
the PCES eventually joined the other four main guerrilla organizations in forming the FMLN, 
though they were one of last factions to do so.109 
 During the conflict, each of the guerrilla organizations chose a leader to represent them in 
the General Command.  Handal served as the PCES General Commander throughout the war 
under the nom de guerre Simón, alongside Salvador Sánchez Cerén (nom de guerre Leonel 
González) of the FPL, Eduardo Sancho (nom de guerre Fermán Cienfuegos) of the RN, 
                                                 
107 Spanish, Instituto Schafik Handal, Biografía, http://schafik.org/biografia.html (April 11, 2011). 
108 These organizations splintered off from one another because of differences in ideology and approach to the 
revolution.   
109 Hudson, 237-239. 
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Francisco Jovel (nom de guerre Roberto Roca) of the PRTC, and René Cruz (nom de guerre 
Joaquín Villalobos) of the ERP. 110  Of the five factions, the PCES was among the smallest, with 
the ERP and the FPL leading in both numbers of supporters and in prominence because of their 
military victories in the departments of Chalatenango and Morazán that gained “liberated 
territories” for the guerrillas.  The PCS fought primarily in the departments of San Salvador and 
Cuscatlán.111     
 In the final months of 1989, the ARENA government of President Alfredo Cristiani and 
the FMLN General Command independently sought the help of United Nations Secretary 
General Javier Pérez de Céllar to find a resolution to the conflict.112  The negotiations resulted in 
a series of accords between July 1990 and January 1992 that pieced together a framework for 
ending the armed conflict and rebuilding a post-war El Salvador.  Schafik Handal was one of the 
leaders of the negotiation process, and signed each of the six different accords that were drafted 
in those final eighteen months of the conflict.  He was present throughout the negotiations, 
played an active part in the dialogue, and is one of the sixteen signers of the final accord.113   
 In the 1990s, Handal served as the first General Coordinator of the FMLN, and oversaw 
the transition of guerrilla organization into a political party.114  He then served as the 
representative for the department of San Salvador115 to the National Legislative Assembly from 
1997 until his death in 2006, during which time he continued to be a vocal advocate for the rights 
of his poorest constituents.  He was also opposed to many initiatives taken up by ARENA, 
particularly the implementation of neo-liberal economic models that rewarded corporate 
                                                 
110 Hudson, 237-239. 
111 Spanish, Marxists Internet Archive,  El Salvador: Guerra Revolucionaria, 1980-1992, 
http://www.marxists.org/espanol/tematica/elsalvador/archivo/index.htm (April 12, 2011).   
112 Spanish, Óscar Martínez Peñate, ed., El Salvador: Los acuerdos de paz y el informe de la comisión de la verdad 
(San Salvador: Editorial Nuevo Enfoque), 2007,  (11). 
113 Peñate, 100.   
114 http://schafik.org/biografia2.html 
115 El Salvador is divided into fourteen states, called departments.   
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investment,116 as well as the decision to support the United States by sending Salvadoran troops 
to Iraq as part of operation “Iraqi Freedom.”117   
 In the final stage of his long political career, Handal ran for president in 2004.  He lost to 
his ARENA opponent, Tony Saca, a businessman, but won over 812,000 votes,118 an 
unprecedented number of FMLN supporters in a country of fewer than 6 million people.  In 2005 
he was chosen by the FMLN to represent El Salvador in the first Central American Parliament 
(PARLACEN).119  On January 24, 2006 Handal died of a heart-attack in the San Salvador airport 
upon returning from the inauguration of Bolivian president Evo Morales.  Today, his face adorns 
FMLN banners, the party’s website, and the newly built monument in the suburb in Mejicanos.  
With time, he has become the political face of the FMLN, and is invoked as a founding father.   
Of the four figures discussed in this project, Handal is the most recently deceased, and 
therefore his legacy and mythology have had the least time to ruminate.  However, I was 
surprised to find that my interviews yielded a generally unified narrative of who Handal  was, 
and what he means today.  In fact, discussions of the commander were the most uniform of any 
of the figures and centered around two aspects: firstly, interviewees described Handal’s role in 
negotiating the peace process as crucial to reaching a resolution to the conflict, and secondly he 
is considered by both his friends and adversaries to have been a consistent, honest and 
respectable politician.  Both of these aspects are tied to his commitment to democracy, which is 
his outstanding hallmark and the root of his ability to be invoked, despite his contentious past, as 
a unifying figure.   
                                                 
116 Michael Soller, “We Don’t (Love) Stinkin’ Yankee Running Dog Warmongers,” The Los Angeles Times, 
February 20, 2005  (http://articles.latimes.com/2005/feb/20/opinion/op-anti20). 







 Ten interviewees discussed Handal with me, and I have also incorporate quotes from 
Gen. Orlando Zepeda’s book, Perfiles de la Guerra (Profiles of the War)120 and the military 
history book En Defensa de la Patria (In Defense of the Fatherland)121 to show that these tropes 
even appear in the most conservative of military histories.  It is also important to note the 
personal connections that several of the interviewees had with Handal.  This is particularly true 
in the case of four interviewees, General Mauricio Vargas, Ana Guadalupe Martínez, Nidia Diaz 
and Dagoberto Gutierrez,  who were all were fellow negotiators during of the peace process.  
This undoubtedly affected the salience of Handal’s role as a negotiator in their minds, and may 
have led to a disproportionate overrepresentation in my interview materials.  I also conducted an 
extensive interview with Handal’s son, legislative representative Jorge Schafik Handal Vega, 
who is currently a leading FMLN politician and the party’s projected candidate for the 2012 
mayorial race of San Salvador.  His role in the party may also have an effect on his father’s 
prominence as an icon.     
 The first narrative trope, Handal as a key negotiator, is articulated in the following quotes 
by fellow members and sympathizers of the left.  For instance, Carlos Henriquez Consalvi, a 
former ERP guerrilla and current head of the Museum of the Word and the Image in San 
Salvador described him, saying: 
Schafik Handal is the protagonist of the peace process… He plays a very big role 
in the negotiation process despite his very explosive demeanor.  In politics, he 
was a man that built a lot of bridges and negotiated with the right wing.”122 
 
This was echoed by Gerson Martínez, a former FPL guerrilla and current Minister of the Interior 
for the FMLN government of President Funes:  
                                                 
120 Spanish, General Juan Orlando Zepeda Herrera. Perfiles de la guerra en El Salvador. (San Salvador, El Salvador: 
NewGraphics, 2008). 
121 Spanish, General Humberto Corado Figueroa, En defensa de la patria: Historia del conflicto armado en El 
Salvador, 1989-1992 (San Salvador, El Salvador: Tecnoimpresas, 2008).   
122 Interview, Carlos Henriquez Consalvi. July 19, 2010. 
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That was Schafik [Handal], a man who sought a democratic means for change, 
that’s how I see him… For the right wing the diplomatic option did not exist. 
Schafik [Handal] is the one that supported dialogue the most; he was one of the 
main intellectual elements in the design of the political solution of the conflict.123 
 
These quotes highlight Handal’s leadership during the peace process, and how, out of all of the 
accomplishments throughout his life, it was this role that was most historically outstanding.  
Handal’s role as peacemaker and pursuer of democracy has come to be his superceding 
identifying characteristic.  Not only is his role as a negotiator considered his primary 
accomplishment, these two quotes also indicate that, compared to the rest of those involved in 
the reconciliation he was “the protagonist” and “the one that supported dialogue the most.” It has  
become his supreme accomplishment in part because he is considered to have led the FMLN out 
of the armed conflict.   
Both Nidia Díaz, a former PRTC guerrilla and current Salvadoran representative of the 
Central American Parliament (PARLACEN), and General Mauricio Vargas discussed Handal in 
very personal terms, highlighting the extensive contact they had with him during the peace talks.  
Díaz  described his meticulous examination methods and fierce style of debate, saying: 
Once I started working more directly in the peace negotiations… we practically 
spent two years in direct contact, living in the same place.  And his methods were 
incredible; he was very diligent, not even a comma slipped by Schafik [Handal] 
during the negotiations.  He was so commited to protecting the interests of the 
people.  We saw his passionate determination not to give in, and his unwaivering 
firmness in the face of the enemy.  It was an incredible negotiation.124 
 
Similarly, General Mauricio Vargas, who sat across the negotiating table from both Handal and 
Díaz, described his impressions of Handal during the negotiations: 
Schafik [Handal] played a very important leadership role.  He was a very 
charismatic person.  Always defending what he really believed in… I got to really 
talk to Schafik during the peace negotiations, it lasted 28 months and three days, 
so I think I can speak to the way he was.  He was a faithful believer and defended 
                                                 
123 Interview, Gerson Martínez.  July 21, 2010 
124 Interview, Nidia Diaz. August 9, 2010.   
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what was his, be it correct or incorrect, tooth and nail.  He definitely played a 
determinant role in the peace negotiations.125 
 
The other two co-signers of the Peace Accord that I interviewed did not directly reference their 
personal contact with Handal.  However, they still considered his role in the negotiations to be a 
key characteristic in their descriptions.  Dagoberto Gutierrez, a fellow member of the PCES, and 
current professor of Philosophy at the Lutheran University of El Salvador described him as,  
…a man with a great sense of humor, a big joker, simple as that, even though he 
had an angry face. He was much more than that, a declared communist, which in 
this country was a thing of life and death… He had a very important role in 
ending the Civil War via negotiations. He played an important part in forming 
FMLN, he was a very efficient official and a good presidential candidate. 126 
 
The most critical voice out of all my interviewees came from former ERP guerrilla Ana 
Guadalupe Martínez.  After the war, she left the FMLN and joined the Partido Demócrata 
Cristiano (Democratic Christian Party or PDC), a party that was in power during the conflict, 
after the 1984 elections when José Napoleón Duarte was elected president.  However, most 
analysts today consider those elections to have been largely discredited due to a widespread 
boycott of the elections, as well as possible fraud.  Throughout her interview, regardless of the 
questions asked, Martínez turned the conversation around in order to repeatedly reference Duarte 
as the father of democracy, and as a victim of history, unfairly preempted by Handal: 
I think [Handal] is replacing Jose Napoleon Duarte who was the real icon of the 
time, who truly represents the system’s reform, the struggle for democracy and 
social justice… [Handal] never sought to raise awareness or provide structure or 
leadership to the guerrilla. He was an important figure as head of the commission 
that took part in the peace negotiations… even though I knew Schafik [Handal] 
personally I think that the main figure for democratic foundation of the country 
was Jose Napoleon Duarte.127 
 
                                                 
125 Interview, General Mauricio Vargas.  July 19, 2010.     
126 Interview, Dagoberto Gutierrez. July 19, 2010. 
127 Interview, Ana Guadalupe Martínez. July 21, 2010.   
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Despite her overall critique of Handal as a leader both during and after the war, the only positive 
thing she says about him concerns his role as a negotiator in the peace process.   The reference to 
Handal’s leadership during the negotiations continues to stand out as one key to understanding 
his legacy.  This can also be seen in the following quote from the military textbook In Defense of 
the Fatherland (En Defensa de la Patria):   
After the failure of the terrorist offensives of November 1989 and 1990… Handal 
spearheaded a move towards dialogue in order to reach an accord, which would 
allow a dignified end to the guerrilla misadventure.  It was this process that 
eventually yielded the Peace Agreements.128 
 
Both of the latter two quotes are critical overall of either Handal specifically (Martínez) or of the 
FMLN in general (the textbook).  However, amidst these negative portrayals, both quotes cite 
Handal’s status as “an important figure as the head of the commission that took part in the peace 
negotiations” and as the leader willing to “spearhead” a “move towards dialogue in order to 
reach an accord.”  Handal is specifically identified with this moment of leadership that garnered 
him respect from across the political spectrum, even from those with whom he had fundamental 
ideological disagreements or who disliked him personally. 
  The second fundamental trope that is utilized in describing Schafik Handal is of his 
consistency, perserverance and honesty as a politician in the post-war era.  His son, FMLN 
congressman Jorge Schafik Handal best sums up this sentiment:  
Schafik [Handal] becomes what every leftist politician should be, honest, loyal to 
his principles, consistent, perseverant, with integrity and confidence in the 
people… He is very respected by his enemies.129  
 
This was echoed by other members of the FMLN, such as former FPL guerrilla and 
Minister of the Interior Gerson Martínez who stated that, “even people who didn’t completely 
agree with his ideas have a great respect for him. I have great respect for him, most of all 
                                                 
128 Corado, 202.  
129 Interview, Jorge Schafik Handal Vega. July 19, 2010.   
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towards his perseverance.”130  Similarly, fellow peace negotiator and former PRTC guerrilla 
Nidia Díaz expressed that,  “I respected Schafik [Handal] very much, his courage to say things as 
they were.  If he said “no” it meant no, if he said “yes” he meant yes.  And he contributed so 
much to [the FMLN’s] beliefs, he was a great leader.”131  In addition to being respected for his 
perserverance, Ricardo Ribera, professor of philosophy at the Universidad Centroamericana 
commented that, “people say that [Handal] could have been mistaken, but not corrupt.  He was 
incorruptible.”132   
 These positive evaluations of character were also shared by his political and ideological 
adversaries.  The best example of this is the following quote from Alfredo Mena Lagos, a 
conservative talk-show host and founding member of ARENA, who described Handal saying, 
Schafik [Handal] rubbed me the right way.  Even though I didn’t agree with him, 
he was honest.  I would always joke with him that he was ‘honestly mistaken.’  
As someone who is proudly right-wing, I got along very well with him.  He kept 
his word, one could chat with him.  Of course he was a product of his childhood 
and his adolescence but he was a democratic leader who could have done a lot of 
good.133  
 
Similarly, General Mauricio Vargas, a fellow participant in the peace negotiations, said of 
Handal that, “Schafik [Handal]… was the type of guy who defended what he believed in tooth 
and nail.  He never wavered on absolutely anything. He was a faithful believer in what was his, 
right or wrong.”  
 If all of these quotes are considered together, a pattern emerges.  Schafik Handal is 
indeed respected by his opponents, and revered by his party.  His reputation is that of as an 
honest, straightforward, and perseverant person in a time when many prominent politicians of all 
                                                 
130 Interview, Gerson Martínez. July 21, 2010.   
131 Interview, Nidia Díaz. August 11, 2010.   
132 Interview, Ricardo Ribera. August 9, 2010.   
133 Interview, Alfredo Mena Lagos. August 12, 2010. 
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parties are accused of corruption.  Though this trope is not articulated in one consistent way, it is 
still clear that Handal was known and respected for his conduct and character. 
 The two overarching narrative trends about Schafik Handal are his importance as a 
negotiator during the time of the peace accords, and his stature as a respectable and honest 
politician.  As both of these are positive, it is not hard to understand why Handal would be 
privately revered by those who knew him.  However, the degree of prominence that Handal has 
attained rivals only that of Farabundo Martí, the 1932 martyr and namesake of the FMLN party.  
For instance, Handal’s face is used in much official FMLN propaganda and publications, 
including the main page of the party’s website, where he appears alongside Martí (depicted in 
Figure 3.4).   Also, the party inaugurated a monument in his honor, in San Salvador, on the 24th 
of January of 2011, on the fifth anniversary of his death, shown in Figure 3.5.  These are just two 
examples of the many ways that Handal is invoked by the FMLN, but they are some of the most 
prominent, and very publicly link Handal with the party that he helped to found.   
 
Figure 3.4134 
                                                 
134 Screen shot of the official FMLN website, http://www.fmln.org.sv, April 14, 2011.  Handal is featured in the 
permanent banner at the top of the page, with 1932 leader Farabundo Martí to his right.   
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 The use of Handal’s likeness on the FMLN website  shows his increased invocation as a 
unifying symbol within the party, though not necessarily beyond.  However, this is important 
because the FMLN has been historically fragmented, in particular after the war officially ended 
and there was much disagreement about the course that the FMLN should take as  a political 
party rather than a guerrilla organization.  Though the various factions that made up the FMLN 
during the conflict have officially been dissolved,  the fragmentation remains present.  Therefore, 
Handal’s rise as a symbolic head of the party is particularly fascinating because of his leadership 
role within the PCES.  
While some question why Handal would be chosen as the new face of the FMLN when 
he was not the most prominent figure during the war, Professor Ricardo Ribera of the UCA 
offers a logical explanation:  
Death allows for this kind of myth to grow and it’s pretty clear that at [the] moment [of 
his death] the FMLN needed a myth, an icon… it was pretty wise of him to die with such 
good timing, he had just been defeated in the elections; he was a founder of the party but 
he didn’t lead any of the main factions… what merits did he have?  His ideological 
consistency, more so than any of the others in the General Command… I think that the 
left, as a democratic left rather than a revolutionary left, needs a figure like him.135 
 
It is true that Handal is the first of the five members who made up the FMLN General Command 
during the war to pass away, and perhaps if another leader of equal prominence had died first, 
Handal’s role may have been filled by someone else.  However, the myth of Schafik Handal is 
special because it can be framed as one that celebrates both peace and democracy, through the 
tropes of his role as a negotiator and as an honest politician.  The FMLN as a political party 
would like to associate itself with both peace and democracy in the minds of voters, because 
these are two powerful ideas that have the capacity to bridge a divided society.  For this reason, 
                                                 
 
135 Interview, Ricardo Ribera. August 9, 2010.   
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the FMLN invests in the long-term preservation of Handal’s memory, as demonstrated in the 




 This monument, built just outside of San Salvador in the suburb of Majicanos to 
commemorate the fifth year anniversary of Handal’s death, has three important parts: the central 
pillar topped with the FMLN’s signature star; the likeness of Handal etched into the block on the 
pillar’s left; and a quotation of Handal’s on to the right that reads, “El Salvador should be a 
country worth living in, where all of us can have the opportunity to work, to see our children 
grow, to pursue progress, and to live securely and with DIGNITY.” These three aspects highlight 
Handal as a figure primarily associated with the FMLN, but who holds universal values about 
human dignity.  As in the case of Archbishop Romero’s monument, the ability for this project to 
go forward , especially so soon after Handal’s death, is an indication of a general level of 
acceptance of Handal as an important historical figure.   
                                                 
136 Design of the monument to Handal, inaugurated on January 24, 2011 on the fifth anniversary of his death.  Image 
from http://www.fmln.org.sv. 
 66 
 In conclusion, my supplemented interview data revealed unified narratives, or consistent 
ways of describing and interpreting Archbishop Oscar Romero and Commander Schafik Handal.  
Romero is commonly hailed as the voice of the voiceless, and as a universal moral and spiritual 
guide.  Handal is discussed largely in terms of his role as a negotiator during the peace process, 
and as an honest and perseverant politician.  All of these narrative trends are generally centered 
around positive attributes that can be palatable to people from across the political spectrum.  For 
instance, by speaking out for the voiceless, Romero stands for bravery and justice, as well as 
being upheld as a righteous man because of his position in the church when he was assassinated.  
On the other hand, Handal represents a desire for peace through his role in the negotiations, as 
well as the ideal politician who is both firm in his beliefs and conducts himself honestly.  Though 
there are undoubtedly those who criticize the rising prominence of both of these men, the ways 
they are invoked in public rhetoric and in public spaces demonstrates their continually expanding 
acceptance as historically important Salvadorans.  Despite the fact that both of these figures are 
openly promoted more so by the political left than by the right, their growing acceptance 
indicates their potential to become increasingly unifying, as future generations who have not 




The four case studies discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 illustrate the special and 
complex results that a negotiated peace process can have on historical memory.  In the post-war 
era, some historical figures, such as Colonel Monterrosa and Major d’Aubuisson are understood 
in competing, contradictory and polarizing ways.  For instance, both of these figures are 
remembered by the right as heroes who fought to contain communist aggression, while the left 
considers them to be among the worst abusers of human rights during the war. Those figures that 
are divisive are remembered by some for their particular abilities, but tend to be tied to some 
war-time event or atrocity that cannot be denied or forgotten by their enemies.  Thus, the 
competing narratives cannot be reconciled.   
Others, such as Archbishop Romero and Commander Handal are emerging as figures 
who are understood in a more unified manner that can foster reconciliation.  Romero is 
remembered as the voice of the voiceless, and as the nation’s transcendent spiritual guide; 
Handal is lifted up as a protagonist of the peace process, and a model politician.  Unifying 
figures are primarily remembered for their merits, which tend to be correlated with post-war 
values such as peace, democracy, and human rights.  For instance both Romero and Handal are 
invoked as representations of the progress El Salvador has made since the 1980s and heralded as 
exemplary national icons. 
In conclusion, the decision to incorporate all of the main warring factions into civil 
society has led to two main benefits:  firstly, institutions such as political parties, the military, 
and the Catholic church are allowed to celebrate and perpetuate their own narratives of history 
without fearing state-sanctioned retribution.  Each of the four figures discussed in previous 
chapters is upheld by his respective institution (and sometime by more than one, as in the case of 
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Archbishop Romero who is celebrated by both the church and the FMLN).  Whether these 
narratives are unifying or polarizing, the ability for them to be expressed, written, and 
transmitted freely is a remarkable change from the way things were before the war.   Secondly, a 
unifying reconciliation narrative is being constructed by a variety of institutions, rather than 
being controlled or imposed solely by the state.  The involvement of multiple groups that 
represent the interests and voices of various sectors of society could eventually lead to a more 
inclusive understanding of the conflict that represents multiple experiences and perspectives,   
though a unified version of history is far from being a reality in El Salvador.  
In future research, I hope to explore what other tropes and historical events are helping to 
foster national reconciliation and healing, for instance the narrative of democracy as a unifying 
national value, and the negotiations at the end of the war as a moment that symbolizes the 
beginning of peace.  Though I saw evidence of both of these narrative tropes in my research, 
their inclusion would have gone beyond the scope of this project.  The four case studies 
described here provide a glimpse into the processes occurring in El Salvador today to make sense 






ARENA: Alianza Republicana Nacionalist de El Salvador.   
Republican Nationalist Alliance of El Salvador.  ARENA is the main conservative 
political party founded by Roberto d’Aubuisson in 1981.  The party held the presidential 
office from 1989-2009. 
 
FMLN: Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional. 
The Farbundo Martí Front for National Liberation.  The FMLN was originally a guerrilla 
organization formed in 1980.  It was composed of the ERP, FPL, PRTC, RN, and PCES 
factions.  The FMLN became a political party in 1992 following the Peace Accords.  In 
2009, Mauricio Funes became the first FMLN candidate to win the presidency. 
 
PCES: Partido Comunista de El Salvador 
 Communist Party of El Salvador 
 
ERP:  Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo 
 The People’s Revolutionary Army 
 
FPL: Fuerzas Populares de Liberación 
 Popular Forces of Liberation 
 
PRTC: Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores Centroamericanos 
 Revolutionary Party of Central-American Workers 
 
RN: Resistencia Nacional 




List of Interviewees 
 
Violeta Menjivar (Interviewed August 8, 2010). 
- Former member of the FPL.  
- Provided medical care on the field.   
- Former diputada (congressional representative). 
- Current vice-minister of health. 
 
Carlos Henriquez Consalvi (Interviewed July 19, 2010). 
- Venezuelan left-wing sympathizer who went to El Salvador in 1979 to make a 
documentary, and joined the guerrilla movement for the remained of the war. 
- Former member of the ERP. 
- Founder and director of Radio Venceremos  (Radio We Shall Be Victorious). 
- Founder and curator of El Museo de la Palabra y la Imagen (The Museum of the Word 
and the Image).  
 
General Mauricio (Chato) Vargas (Interviewed July 19, 2010). 
- Military officer. 
- Participated in the peace talks and signed the Peace Accords. 
 
Alfredo Mena Lagos (August 12, 2010). 
- Founder of the Nationalist Party of El Salvador, which later was incorporated into 
ARENA. 
- Descendant of landed oligarchy, today still owns coffee plantations. 
- Lived in the US for 18 years. 
- Host of the conservative radio and television program, Pensando en Voz Alta (thinking 
out loud).   
 
Dagoberto Gutierrez (July 19, 2010). 
- Former member of the PCES. 
- Participated in the peace talks and signed the Peace Accords. 
- Current vice-rector at the Lutheran University of El Salvador. 
 
 
Zoila Milagro Navas (July 26, 2010).   
- Has been the mayor of Antiguo Cusctlán, a wealthy suburb of San Salvador, for more 
than twenty years.   
- A close personal friend of Roberto d’Aubuisson 
 
Ana Guadalupe Martínez (July 21, 2010). 
- Part of the ERP leadership during the war. 
- After the war, broke with the FMLN 
- Became a diputada (legislator) for the Partído Demócrata Cristiano, a party formed in the 
late 1960’s and who were disenfranchised in the 1972 elections.  Their leader, Napoleón 
Duarte was part of the 1979 junta that took power of the country, and he was elected 
 71 
president (1984-1989).  Today the PDC is one of the smaller political parties who 
participate mostly at a local and legislative level.  
 
Gerson Martínez (July 21, 2010). 
- Founding member of the FPL 
- Currently Minister of Public Works 
 
Jorge Schafik Handal Vega (July 19, 2010). 
- Son of Schafik 
- Now a diputado for the department of Usulután 
 
Ricardo Ribera (August 9, 2010). 
- Professor of Philosophy and Sociology at the Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón 
Cañas (UCA).   
  
Nidia Díaz (August 11, 2010).   
- Former PRTC guerrilla. 
- Author of the internationally successful memoir I was Never Alone about her experience 
as a prisoner of war.   
- Participant in the peace talks, and signer of the Peace Accord. 
- Current member of the Cenral American Parlament (PARLACEN). 
 
Eduardo Linares (July 26, 2010). 
- Former FPL guerrilla. 
- Current director of the Salvadoran State Intelligence Organization. 
 
Ronaldo Cáceres (July 30, 2010). 
- Former ERP guerrilla. 
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